Based on the 9/11 Commission hearing on January 27, 2004, the commission’s staff noted: ” ‘The anti-hijacking training for civil aviation crews in place on 9/11 was based on previous experiences with domestic and international hijacking. It was aimed at getting passengers, crew, and hijackers safely landed. It offered little guidance for confronting a suicide […]
1/27/2004
During his testimony before the 9/11 Commission on January 27, 2004, “Cathal Flynn, a former security chief at the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], said he was not aware of the State Department’s watch list of suspected terrorists until…more than two years after 9/11.” – Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, Without Precedent, Page 138 […]
1/27/2004
The 9/11 Commission reported, “Claudio Manno, a former intelligence director at the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], said [at the January 27, 2004 commission hearing] that before 9/11 the CIA was reluctant to reveal the names of suspected terrorists to the FAA because that information was classified.” – Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, Without Precedent, Page […]
1/27/2004
Based on the 9/11 Commission hearing of January 27, 2004, which detailed aviation security and the four hijacked flights, the commission revealed: “Nine of the nineteen hijackers were actually selected by the FAA’s [Federal Aviation Administration’s] computer-assisted passenger pre-screening (CAPPS) program, which checks the list of passengers against certain risk factors in order to identify […]
1/27/2004
Following a hearing on January 27, 2004, the 9/11 Commission reported: “We learned that the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] did have information before 9/11 warning about the possibility of a hijacking by terrorists affiliated with Usama Bin Ladin and al Qaeda–including suicide hijackings in which an aircraft would be used as a weapon. Yet none […]
1/26/2004
The CIA’s former chief weapons inspector, David Kay, “said the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies did not realize that Iraqi scientists had presented ambitious but fanciful weapons programs to Mr. Hussein and had then used the money for other purposes. Dr. Kay also reported that Iraq attempted to revive its efforts to develop nuclear weapons […]
1/26/2004
In a Mother Jones article on January 26, 2004, retired Air Force Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski said, of David Wurmser’s Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group: ” ‘They’d take a little bit of intelligence, cherry-pick it, make it sound much more exciting, usually by taking it out of context, often by juxtaposition of two pieces of information […]
1/26/2004
Based on the 9/11 Commission hearing on January 26, 2004, the commission staff issued a statement discussing missed opportunities in averting 9/11: “Every time a hijacker offered up a doctored passport, made a false statement on a visa application or in an interview, or violated an immigration law, there was an opportunity to foil the […]
1/26/2004
From a 9/11 Commission hearing on January 26, 2004, in regards to whether the hijackers entered the U.S. legally, the commission noted: “Two of the surviving passports had been doctored, and the other two had…’suspicious indicators.’ Three hijackers had made false statements on visa applications that could have been detected…and three of those five had […]
1/25/2004
The CIA’s former chief weapons inspector “Dr. [David] Kay said the fundamental errors in prewar intelligence assessments [in Iraq] were so grave that he would recommend that the Central Intelligence Agency and other organizations overhaul their intelligence collection and analytical efforts. Dr. Kay said analysts had come to him, ‘almost in tears, saying they felt […]