9/15/1998

In mid-September 1998, in the aftermath of the August 7, 1998, African embassy bombings in Africa, “The bin Laden unit’s leader, an analyst known to his colleagues as Mike, argued with rising emotion that the CIA and the White House had become prisoners of their alliances with Saudi Arabia and Pakistani intelligence. America was in a […]

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9/15/1998

“Threat reports also mentioned the possibility of using an aircraft filled with explosives. The most prominent of these mentioned a possible plot to fly an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. city. This report, circulated in September 1998, originated from a source who had walked into an American consulate in East Asia.” [The 15th of the […]

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9/15/1998

Sami ul Haq, head of a madrassa near Peshawar, Pakistan, said in a September 1998 interview: ” ‘I think America has made Osama a supernatural being. Wherever the terrorism occurs, right away they think of him. I don’t think he has such influence, or such control and resources. Osama bin Laden has become a symbol […]

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9/13/1998

A declassified U.S. Department of State cable, dated September 13, 1998, describes an exchange between Taliban official Abdul Hakim Mujahid and a U.S. diplomat in Pakistan. Mujahid said: ” ‘Very few Afghans are in favor of Bin Ladin’s presence in Afghanistan. Eighty percent of the Taliban leadership opposes his presence, including Taliban deputy leader Mullah […]

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9/11/1998

On September 11, 1998, three weeks after the botched cruise missile strike on Osama bin Laden, CIA Director George “Tenet met with the rest of the leaders of the American intelligence community. They agreed that they had to make ‘substantial and sweeping changes’ in the way the nation collected, analyzed, and produced information. If they […]

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9/11/1998

“Incredibly while performing missions for al-Qaeda, [al Qaeda double agent Ali] Mohamed continued to apply for work in U.S. government agencies [FBI & Department of Defense]. …In September [11] 1998 Ali Mohamed’s double life came to an abrupt halt when he was arrested on suspicion of being part of al-Qaeda’s conspiracy to kill Americans…opting for […]

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9/10/1998

“On September 10, 1998, [al Qaeda double agent Ali] Mohamed was finally arrested [in New York], after the August 1998 embassy bombings for which he had been directly responsible. Yet when indictments were handed down two months later, the name of Ali Mohamed, the ringleader, was not among the thirteen people indicted. Instead he was […]

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9/10/1998

“Days after the [August 7, 1998, African embassy] bombing, [al Qaeda double agent] Ali Mohamed confesses to the Feds what should have been obvious to them for years: that he knows who did the bombings. But the Feds don’t search his house for several weeks. Finally, on September 10 [1998], the FBI arrests him after […]

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9/9/1998

According to information in a Washington Post article on September 9, 1998, “With the help of the CTC [Counterterrorism Center], forty terrorists from the former Yugoslavia were captured and turned over to Arab governments, usually Egypt. Egyptian security is believed to have tortured, tried, and executed many of them. In this way, al Qaeda cells […]

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9/9/1998

“Saddam himself helped spur enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act [a U.S. law declaring the intent of Iraq regime change] when he decided in August 1998 to end Iraq’s cooperation with UN weapons inspections. He closed the door on both UNSCOM [UN Special Commission on Iraq] and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN body […]

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