“Beginning in May and continuing through early July 2001, NSA [National Security Agency] intercepted thirty-three separate messages indicating that bin Laden intended to mount one or more terrorist attacks against U.S. targets in the near future. But the intercepts provided no specifics about the impending operation other than that ‘Zero Hour was near.’ “ [The […]
7/5/2001
On July 5, 2001, counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke chaired a meeting “with representatives from the CIA, FBI, Federal Aviation Administration, Customs, INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service], and others. The meeting concluded with the issuance of several new security advisories, including an FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] Bulletin warning of an increased risk of hijackings to free […]
7/5/2001
Former CIA Director George Tenet wrote: “The FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] Court was tremendously helpful, yet it was becoming increasingly evident by early July of 2001 that further legislative improvements were needed because the existing statutes did not give us the flexibility we needed to get on top of a savvy and increasingly sophisticated […]
7/5/2001
According to failed millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam’s testimony on July 5, 2001, “Al-Qaeda experimented with cyanide in the hope it could be introduced into the air intakes of U.S. government buildings.” – Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Page 144 […]
7/5/2001
On July 5, 2001, “terrorism czar Richard Clarke called a White House meeting with officials from the FBI, FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], Coast Guard, Secret Service, and INS [Immigration and Naturalization Services], warning that ‘something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it’s going to happen soon.’ The next day, Clarke chaired a meeting […]
7/5/2001
“On July 5 [2001], President Bush asked National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice to assess the al Qaeda threat. Later, after 9/11, Rice admitted that the threat-reporting at the time ‘had become sufficiently robust–not again very specific, but sufficiently robust. There was a lot of chatter in the system.’ ” – Peter Lance, 1000 Years For […]
7/5/2001
After being pulled over for a traffic citation in Florida on April 26, 2001, lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta was scheduled for a court appearance a month later. He skipped, and “Now his name was entered into the computer for all Florida police precincts.” When he was pulled over again, on July 5, 2001, the […]
7/5/2001
“By July 5, 2001, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice reported that, while ‘nonspecific,’ the intelligence [regarding an impending terrorist attack] was ‘sufficiently robust’ that President George W. Bush asked her ‘to go back and to see what was being done about all of the chatter.’ But White House terrorism adviser Richard Clarke had a more […]
7/5/2001
“On July 5 [2001], he [counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke] assembled officials from a dozen different federal agencies–the Coast Guard, the FBI, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and others–in the White House Situation Room. ‘Something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it’s going to happen soon,’ Clarke told them.” – Craig […]
7/5/2001
On July 5, 2001, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice organized a meeting with counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card, “to discuss how the FBI and other domestic agencies were prepared to deal with what the CIA believed was an imminent terrorist strike.” – Philip Shenon, The Commission, Page 301 […]