In the Iraq Survey Group’s September 30, 2004 report (the Duelfer Report), group head Charles Duelfer said: ” ‘In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the regime multiple times… He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will.’ […]
9/30/2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) stated in the Duelfer Report, issued on September 30, 2004: ” ‘While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a […]
9/30/2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG), released its final report, the Duelfer Report, on September 30, 2004. ” ‘ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW [biological weapons] program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes.’ ” – Philip Taylor, The War in Iraq, Page 1 […]
9/30/2004
“During the September 30, 2004, presidential debate, Democratic contender Senator John Kerry [of Massachusetts] said of capturing bin Laden, ‘He escaped in the mountains of Tora Bora [Afghanistan]. We had him surrounded.’ ” – Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, Page 331 […]
9/30/2004
In his report made on September 30, 2004, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) leader Charles Duelfer reported that, despite the suspension of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, “after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital developed during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Senior Iraqis–several from the Regime’s inner circle–told ISG [Iraq Survey Group] they […]
9/30/2004
In his report made on September 30, 2004, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) leader Charles Duelfer reported: ” ‘ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations.’ ” – Douglas Feith, War and […]
9/30/2004
In his report made on September 30, 2004, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) leader Charles Duelfer reported: ” ‘[B]etween 1991 and 1996 Iraq possessed an expanding BW [biological weapons] agent production capability. From 1996 to OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] [March 20, 2003], Iraq still possessed small but significant dual-use facilities capable of conversion to small-scale BW […]
9/30/2004
In his report made on September 30, 2004, Iraq Survey Group leader Charles Duelfer reported: ” ‘The [Iraqi] Regime quickly came to see that OFF [the Oil-for-Food program] could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development. By 2000-2001, […]
9/30/2004
In his report made on September 30, 2004, Iraq Survey Group leader Charles Duelfer reported: ” ‘With the bulk of Iraq’s BW [biological weapons] program in ruins, Iraq after 1996 continued small-scale BW-related efforts with the only remaining asset at Baghdad’s disposal–the know-how of the small band of BW scientists and technicians who carried out […]
9/30/2004
“Years later, after Saddam’s overthrow, the American-British-Australian Iraq Survey Group (ISG) investigated Iraq’s WMD history.” On September 30, 2004, “The ISG’s American head, Charles Duelfer, confirmed that ‘Iraq’s interest in camel pox and its inclusion in the viral BW [biological weapons] program have led ISG to assess that camel pox R&D was a surrogate for […]