6/15/1992

“A National Intelligence Estimate was actually published in [June] 1992 with the title ‘Saddam Husayn: Likely to Hang On.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, Page 149 […]

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5/20/1992

In a speech at the National Press Club on May 20, 1992, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said he was ‘comfortable’ with the fact that Operation Desert Storm did not try to unseat Saddam from power in Iraq. ” ‘We could have gone on,’ he told reporters nearly fifteen months after the end of the […]

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4/15/1992

From The Riegle Report, which was delivered to the Senate on February 9, 1994, regarding the health of Gulf War veterans, “According to the Department of Defense’s own Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, released in April 1992: ‘By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had developed biological […]

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4/15/1992

“In 1991, President George H.W. Bush ordered a reassessment of the intelligence needs and priorities of the government for the next fifteen years. …The result of the reassessment, delivered in April 1992, identified no fewer than 176 threats; narcotics and terrorism ranked below nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as second-tier threats. The reassessment did not […]

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3/30/1992

On March 30, 1992, “President George H.W. Bush answered the question as to why we did not go on to Baghdad to take out Saddam Hussein [in 1991]: ‘We certainly had the military capability to go on to Baghdad. But once we had prevailed and had toppled Saddam Hussein’s government, we presumably would have had […]

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3/28/1992

“On March 28, 1992, the Mukhabarat [Iraqi Intelligence Service] compiled…a list [of Saudis and Kuwaitis considered to be intelligence assets]. It is twenty pages long, with ‘Top Secret’ marked at the top of each page. On page 14 is a now-familiar name: Osama bin Laden. The authors of the document assert that bin Laden ‘is […]

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3/15/1992

Following the collapse of the Iraqi nuclear weapon program in the summer of 1991, “In March 1992, [Saddam’s son-in-law] Hussein Kamel convinced Saddam to let him keep the nuclear scientists together within his organization, the Military Industrialization Commission. There, [engineer] Saad [Tawfiq] and the rest of the team found themselves working on Hussein Kamel’s pet […]

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3/11/1992

On March 11, 1992, Director-in-Charge of International Affairs Issues, Joseph E. Kelley,  submitted a classified GAO (United States General Accounting Office) report titled, ‘Iraq: U.S. Military Items Exported or Transferred to Iraq in the 1980s.’ It read: “According to a State official, Iraq became ineligible to participate in U.S. foreign military sales when it broke […]

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3/8/1992

Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Gary Milhollin wrote, on March 8, 1992: “In the five years before the [first] Persian Gulf war, for example, the Commerce Department licensed more than $1.5 billion of strategically sensitive American exports to Iraq. Many were for direct delivery to nuclear weapon, chemical weapon and missile […]

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2/18/1992

“One of the most distinctive aspects of neoconservative ideology is a tendency toward expansionism. It manifests itself in a desire to push for steady economic growth on the domestic front. Abroad, the same expansionist tendency translates into an aggressive foreign policy backed by military strength. This tendency was obvious as early as [February 18] 1992, […]

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