1/15/1996

In January 1996, “the CIA estimated that fifty Islamic charities ‘support terrorist groups or employ individuals who are suspected of having terrorist connections.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda, Page 62 […]

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1/15/1996

“At the same time [January 1996], the two bin Laden ‘offices of origin’ in New York, the SDNY [Southern District of New York] and the FBI’s NYO [New York Office], dedicated an existing unit, Squad I-49, to building a case against the Saudi billionaire.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] […]

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1/15/1996

“In January 1996, a decision was taken by senior staff of the CIA’s 200-strong Counterterrorist Center…to form a special bin Laden taskforce. Ever since, the Osama bin Laden desk, manned by elite staff of more than eleven federal agencies, has mounted the largest, most expensive and most extensive investigation ever into a single individual charged […]

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1/15/1996

Regarding Osama bin Laden: “In January 1996, the CIA created a counterterrorism unit of a dozen people devoted entirely to the Saudi–the bin Laden station. There was a sense that he might start taking aim at American targets abroad.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Tim Weiner, Legacy of […]

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1/15/1996

“In January 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained information concerning a planned suicide attack by persons associated with [militant Islamist] Shaykh [Omar Abdel] al-Rahman and a key al Qaeda operative to fly to the United States from Afghanistan and attack the White House.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Peter […]

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1/9/1996

“While still British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher had famously warned President George H.W. Bush not to ‘go wobbly’ after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. But the formidable Thatcher had been voted out of office before the war was concluded. She seemed unhappy with the result in Iraq. ‘There is the aggressor, Saddam Hussein, still in power,’ […]

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1/9/1996

“General Wafiq al Sammarai, who headed Iraqi military intelligence during the Gulf War, said in an interview [with Frontline on PBS on January 9, 1996] that some of the Iraqi’s Scud missiles had been loaded with chemical warheads, but they were not used, ‘because the warning was quite severe and quite effective. The allied troops […]

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1/9/1996

According to an interview with Dick Cheney for Frontline: The Gulf War, which first aired on January 9, 1996: ” ‘I was not an enthusiast about getting U.S. forces and going into Iraq,’ Cheney later said. ‘We were there in the southern part of Iraq to the extent we needed to be there to defeat […]

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1/1/1996

Former Iraqi Army Captain Sabah Khodada worked at the Salman Pak military facility outside of Baghdad. He spoke with PBS’s Frontline and The New York Times on October 14, 2001. In describing the training at the camp, he said: ” ‘…the purpose of establishing Saddam’s fighters is to attack American targets and American interests. This […]

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12/15/1995

“Representatives of Osama bin Laden contacted Iranian intelligence agents in the mid-1990’s [December 1995] in an attempt to forge an anti-American alliance of terror between Iran and Mr. bin Laden’s network, Al Qaeda, according to United States intelligence reports.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – James Risen, “Bin Laden […]

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