1/7/2000

The CIA released a top secret report titled, ‘Update, Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,’ on January 7, 2000. Regarding the increase in terrorist activity around the millennium change, it noted, in a section titled, ‘What Did We See:’ “-Significantly increased [terrorist] activity. -Clear evidence of planning/preparations for attacks. -The Millennium celebration likely intended to be the ‘kick […]

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1/6/2000

Then-CIA Director George Tenet commented on a January 6, 2000, email from a CIA officer, regarding the Malaysia meeting of future 9/11 attackers: “Once we had learned the names of several of the individuals who were attending the Malaysia meeting, CIA should have placed them on a watchlist that might have prevented their entering the […]

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1/5/2000

Based on the confession of Mohamed Rashed al-‘Owali, the Saudi who drove the bomb-laden truck in the August 1998 embassy bombing in Kenya, the FBI learned of a safehouse in Yemen that was “being used as an al Qaeda ‘logistics center’…to patch through phone calls from bin Laden operatives worldwide…As a result, the NSA [National […]

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1/5/2000

In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on January 5, 2000, “a camera captured [future 9/11 hijacker Khalid] al-Midhar meeting with Tawfiq bin Atash, the one-legged chief of security for Osama bin Laden. About a dozen men attended the secret multiday conference. Malaysian intelligence officers delivered copies of the pictures to the CIA within weeks, but inexplicably, the […]

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1/5/2000

“Another top al Qaeda operative at the summit [in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on January 5, 2000] is Khallad bin Atash, who played a key role in the [African] embassy bombings and will later direct the attack on the U.S.S. Cole with Yemeni Fahad al-Quso. Also present is Riduan Isamuddin, aka Hambali, an Indonesian cleric who […]

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1/5/2000

“One lesson that the FBI should have learned from the Malaysian summit [of al Qaeda on January 5, 2000] was just how well coordinated al Qaeda was…al Qaeda was a tightly integrated network with directions coming from the top down directly via bin Laden and [second-in-command] Dr. [Ayman] al-Zawahiri. It was an international network capable […]

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1/5/2000

In early January, 2000, “CIA agents tracked [future 9/11 hijacker Khalid al] Mihdhar to Dubai, where he was staying, en route to [an al Qaeda meeting in] Malaysia. They broke into his hotel room and photographed his passport, which reflected that Mihdhar had a multi-entry U.S. visa that would not expire until April 2000. They […]

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1/5/2000

On January 5, 2000, future 9/11 Hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar had his Saudi passport secretly photocopied by customs agents in Dubai. His information was sent to the CIA’s Alec Station. “Mihdhar’s Saudi passport contained a valid multi-entry visa for the United States. And his visa application…showed Mihdhar’s destination was New York. Doug Miller, one of three […]

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1/5/2000

“The FBI believes as many as nine top al Qaeda terrorists attended the [January 5-8, 2000, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia] meeting, including Ramzi bin al Shibh, who later boasted to a journalist of his role as ‘coordinator of the Holy Tuesday operation’–the September 11 attacks.”  – Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection, Page 4 […]

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1/5/2000

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. Regarding surveillance of future 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar in early January 2000, it read: “We had at that point the level of detail needed to watchlist him–that is, to nominate him to State Department for refusal […]

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