1/15/2000

“Of all the 9/11 hijackers, these two Saudis [Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi] had the longest records of al Qaeda involvement, and beginning in January 2000, they soon became the most visible of the nineteen operatives. In fact, these two failed pilots appeared on the radar of the NSA [National Security Agency], the CIA, and […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000

1/15/2000

“The sole purpose for setting up [the CIA’s] Alec Station was to keep track of bin Laden and members of Al Qaeda–and most important, to keep them out of the United States. Yet after NSA [National Security Agency] managed to pick up the first clue, and after a successful worldwide operation that tracked [future 9/11 […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000

1/15/2000

“The agency’s [CIA’s] ‘lapse’ in [future 9/11 hijacker Khalid] al-Mihdhar’s case, [CIA Director George] Tenet said later [in his testimony to the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002], ‘was caused by a combination of inadequate training of some of our officers, their intense focus on achieving the objectives of the operation itself, determining whether […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000

1/15/2000

“…there are clear signs that Iran helped al Qaeda, including providing lodging for two key al Qaeda operatives at the Iranian Embassy in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia, during a January 2000 meeting of al Qaeda terrorists there.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Bill Gertz, Breakdown, Page 165 […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000

1/15/2000

Defense Intelligence Agency specialist Kie Fallis wrote a highly classified report in May 2000, which said: ” ‘I obtained information in January of 2000 that indicated terrorists were planning two or three major attacks against the United States,’ he said. ‘The only gaps were where and when.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000

1/15/2000

“In January 2000, it [the U.N.] established the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)… Under the terms of UNMOVIC, Iraq no longer had to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction in order to gain a reprieve from U.N. sanctions; it merely needed to demonstrate ‘cooperation.’ UNMOVIC was also designed to be ‘more aligned […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000

1/15/2000

“In January 2000 he [deputy chief of Alec Station Tom Wilshire] had spiked the message drafted by Doug Miller, one of the FBI agents assigned to the station, alerting his headquarters to [future 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-] Mihdhar’s U.S. visa and New York travel plans. Wilshire also never alerted the State Department, which would have […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000

1/15/2000

“As [future National Security Advisor] Condoleezza Rice had written in a 2000 article in [the January-February 2000] Foreign Affairs, with respect to Iraq and other rogue states, ‘the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence–if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000

1/15/2000

Future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice wrote an article for the January/February 2000 issue of Foreign Affairs, which summed up future President Bush’s foreign policy. The article “was unusually critical of the Clinton administration for deploying American forces in conflicts like Haiti, and questioned the moral impulse to spread American democracy when what really mattered, […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000

1/15/2000

In January 2000, Ambassador for Counterterrorism Michael Sheehan phoned Taliban foreign minister Wakil Muttawakil and “read him an unambiguous statement from [President Bill] Clinton: ‘We will hold the Taliban leadership responsible for any attacks against US interests by al-Qaeda or any of its affiliated groups.’ Muttawakil, who was privately one of bin Laden’s most bitter […]

Read More… from 1/15/2000