“Of all the 9/11 hijackers, these two Saudis [Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi] had the longest records of al Qaeda involvement, and beginning in January 2000, they soon became the most visible of the nineteen operatives. In fact, these two failed pilots appeared on the radar of the NSA [National Security Agency], the CIA, and […]
Category: quotes
1/15/2000
“The sole purpose for setting up [the CIA’s] Alec Station was to keep track of bin Laden and members of Al Qaeda–and most important, to keep them out of the United States. Yet after NSA [National Security Agency] managed to pick up the first clue, and after a successful worldwide operation that tracked [future 9/11 […]
1/15/2000
“The agency’s [CIA’s] ‘lapse’ in [future 9/11 hijacker Khalid] al-Mihdhar’s case, [CIA Director George] Tenet said later [in his testimony to the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002], ‘was caused by a combination of inadequate training of some of our officers, their intense focus on achieving the objectives of the operation itself, determining whether […]
1/15/2000
“…there are clear signs that Iran helped al Qaeda, including providing lodging for two key al Qaeda operatives at the Iranian Embassy in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia, during a January 2000 meeting of al Qaeda terrorists there.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – Bill Gertz, Breakdown, Page 165 […]
1/15/2000
Defense Intelligence Agency specialist Kie Fallis wrote a highly classified report in May 2000, which said: ” ‘I obtained information in January of 2000 that indicated terrorists were planning two or three major attacks against the United States,’ he said. ‘The only gaps were where and when.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for […]
1/15/2000
“In January 2000, it [the U.N.] established the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)… Under the terms of UNMOVIC, Iraq no longer had to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction in order to gain a reprieve from U.N. sanctions; it merely needed to demonstrate ‘cooperation.’ UNMOVIC was also designed to be ‘more aligned […]
1/15/2000
“In January 2000 he [deputy chief of Alec Station Tom Wilshire] had spiked the message drafted by Doug Miller, one of the FBI agents assigned to the station, alerting his headquarters to [future 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-] Mihdhar’s U.S. visa and New York travel plans. Wilshire also never alerted the State Department, which would have […]
1/12/2000
“On January 12, 2000, the chief of the CIA’s al Qaeda unit briefed his bosses about the Kuala Lumpur [Malaysia] [terrorist summit] meeting. The official, apparently unaware that the meeting had broken up four days earlier, reported erroneously that the surveillance in Kuala Lumpur was continuing. Three days later, unbeknownst to U.S. officials, [future 9/11 […]
1/11/2000
Fearing upcoming attacks, counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke wrote to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger on January 11, 2000, saying: “The CIA, the FBI, Justice and the NSC [National Security Council] staff had come to two main conclusions. First, the U.S. disruption efforts thus far had ‘not put too much of a dent’ in Bin Ladin’s […]
1/8/2000
Following the summit of al Qaeda plotters in Malaysia, future 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, along with African embassy bombing planner Khallad bin Atash, flew to Bangkok, Thailand, on January 8, 2000. All three had been tracked by members of the intelligence agencies. “And yet following the January 8 flight, both the FBI […]