8/6/2001

“In his daily intelligence briefing on August 6 [2001], President Bush, vacationing at his ranch in Crawford, Texas, got a report that warned of potential hijackings. …the top-secret memo was entitled ‘Bin Laden determined to Strike in U.S.‘ …the briefing reportedly contained a reference to a 1998 British intelligence report that hijackers might grab an […]

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8/6/2001

The August 6, 2001, President’s Daily Brief (PDB), “titled ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.‘…was the thirty-sixth time so far that year that bin Laden or al-Qaeda had been discussed in a PDB.”  – James Bamford, The Shadow Factory, Page 69 […]

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8/6/2001

“Taking a month off [for a ‘working vacation’ at his ranch in Crawford, Texas] after only six months in office, [President] Bush seemed undeterred by the criticism at the time. In a USA Today poll released on August 6 [2001]…55 percent of those questioned felt that the president was taking too much time off.”  – […]

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8/6/2001

“Contemporaneous reports on the day that [President] Bush received the intelligence report [the President’s Daily Briefing, titled ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.‘], August 6 [2001], indicated that he had broken off from work early and gone fishing.”  – Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold, Page 47 […]

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8/5/2001

“Officials…said the CIA had developed general information a month before the attacks that heightened concerns that bin Laden and his followers were increasingly determined to strike on U.S. soil after several strikes overseas. The information indicated bin Laden and his supporters ‘were trying to bring the fight to America’ but details were lacking, a U.S. […]

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8/4/2001

Alleged 20th hijacker Mohamed al-Kahtani arrived in the U.S. at Orlando International Airport on August 4, 2001. “As he attempted to go through immigration, inspector Jose Melendez-Perez grew suspicious. Al-Kahtani had no return ticket, limited funds, no hotel reservations, and he refused to identify the ‘friend’ he said was waiting for him. That friend, videotape […]

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8/4/2001

“On August 4 [2001], [lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed] Atta drove to the Orlando airport to pick up a final hijacker, Mohamed al Khatani. Khatani was detained by INS [Immigration and Naturalization Services] officials, however, because he spoke no English, was traveling with a one-way ticket and little money, and could not explain what he planned […]

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8/4/2001

“FBI ‘clean teams,’ which gather evidence without using information gained during controversial interrogations, have established that [Mohammed] Qahtani intended to join the [September 11] 2001 hijackers. Mohammed Atta, the plot’s leader…went to the airport in Orlando, Fla., to meet Qahtani on Aug. 4, 2001, but the young Saudi was denied entry by a suspicious immigration […]

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8/3/2001

“On August 3 [2001], the intelligence community issued an advisory concluding that the threat of impending al Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefinitely. Citing threats in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, the advisory suggested that al Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in security before moving forward with the planned […]

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8/2/2001

9/11 hijackers Hani Hanjour and Khalid al-Mihdhar obtained papers as official residents of Virginia on August 1, 2001. “The next day [August 2, 2001], Hanjour and al-Mihdhar made use of their new identity papers to become sponsors of ‘logistics men’ Majed Moqed and [Salim] Alhamzi. The other hijackers procured new identification papers the same way. […]

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