8/6/2001

“President Bush would later claim that the [August 6, 2001] PDB [President’s Daily Brief] contained no ‘actionable intelligence’: ‘There was not a time and place of an attack. It said Osama bin Laden had designs on America. Well, I knew that. What I wanted to know was, is there anything specifically going to take place […]

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8/6/2001

The August 6, 2001, Presidential Daily Briefing was titled ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the U.S.‘ Though it was a classified document, NBC reported that chemical and biological weapons were discussed. “Over the next 30 days, President Bush had no further meetings about terrorism.”  – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page […]

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8/6/2001

Former CIA Director George Tenet commented on possible al-Qa’ida strikes in the U.S.: “Whenever a PDB [President’s Daily Briefing] contained information about possible al-Qa’ida attacks, the president [Bush] would ask his PDB briefer, Mike Morell, what information we had that might indicate an attack could come inside the United States. …That was the origin of […]

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8/6/2001

“[O]n August 6 [2001], the president’s [Bush’s] daily brief began with the headline ‘Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US.’ The warning beneath the headline was a very weak piece of reporting. The freshest intelligence in it dated from 1999.”  – Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, Page 554 […]

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8/5/2001

“Officials…said the CIA had developed general information a month before the attacks that heightened concerns that bin Laden and his followers were increasingly determined to strike on U.S. soil after several strikes overseas. The information indicated bin Laden and his supporters ‘were trying to bring the fight to America’ but details were lacking, a U.S. […]

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8/4/2001

“FBI ‘clean teams,’ which gather evidence without using information gained during controversial interrogations, have established that [Mohammed] Qahtani intended to join the [September 11] 2001 hijackers. Mohammed Atta, the plot’s leader…went to the airport in Orlando, Fla., to meet Qahtani on Aug. 4, 2001, but the young Saudi was denied entry by a suspicious immigration […]

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8/4/2001

Alleged 20th hijacker Mohamed al-Kahtani arrived in the U.S. at Orlando International Airport on August 4, 2001. “As he attempted to go through immigration, inspector Jose Melendez-Perez grew suspicious. Al-Kahtani had no return ticket, limited funds, no hotel reservations, and he refused to identify the ‘friend’ he said was waiting for him. That friend, videotape […]

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8/4/2001

“On August 4 [2001], [lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed] Atta drove to the Orlando airport to pick up a final hijacker, Mohamed al Khatani. Khatani was detained by INS [Immigration and Naturalization Services] officials, however, because he spoke no English, was traveling with a one-way ticket and little money, and could not explain what he planned […]

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8/3/2001

“On August 3 [2001], the intelligence community issued an advisory concluding that the threat of impending al Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefinitely. Citing threats in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, the advisory suggested that al Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in security before moving forward with the planned […]

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8/2/2001

9/11 hijackers Hani Hanjour and Khalid al-Mihdhar obtained papers as official residents of Virginia on August 1, 2001. “The next day [August 2, 2001], Hanjour and al-Mihdhar made use of their new identity papers to become sponsors of ‘logistics men’ Majed Moqed and [Salim] Alhamzi. The other hijackers procured new identification papers the same way. […]

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