8/15/2001

From the 9/11 Commission Report’s list of Operational Opportunities: “August 2001: FBI headquarters does not recognize the significance of the information regarding [suspected terrorist Zacarias] Moussaoui’s training and beliefs and thus does not take adequate action to share information, involve higher-level officials across agencies, obtain information regarding Moussaoui’s ties to al Qaeda, and give sufficient […]

Read More… from 8/15/2001

8/15/2001

Pointing blame towards the ‘wall’ which prevented the sharing of information between counterintelligence and law enforcement officials, presidential advisor Karl Rove wrote: “two of the terrorists who crashed Flight 77 into the Pentagon on 9/11 [Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar] managed to escape FBI detection the previous month [August 2001] because an agent […]

Read More… from 8/15/2001

8/15/2001

From the 9/11 Commission Report’s list of Operational Opportunities: “August 2001: the CIA does not focus on information that [9/11 mastermind] Khalid Sheikh Mohammed [KSM] is a key al Qaeda lieutenant or connect information identifying KSM as the ‘Mukhtar’ mentioned in other reports to the analysis that could have linked ‘Mukhtar’ with [9/11 conspirator] Ramzi […]

Read More… from 8/15/2001

8/15/2001

“On August 15 [2001], he [head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, Cofer Black] concluded a briefing to the Department of Defense’s Annual Convention on Counterterrorism with the comment, ‘We are going to be struck soon, many Americans are going to die, and it could be in the U.S.’ “  – James Bamford, The Shadow Factory, […]

Read More… from 8/15/2001

8/14/2001

Potential hijacker Zacarias “Moussaoui’s classroom instructor knew that affluent hobbyists sometimes signed up for simulator training even if they didn’t have a [pilot’s] license, but Moussaoui’s decision to rush the training, and to ask so many questions about things like protocol for communicating with air traffic controllers, created worry. At a routine staff meeting on […]

Read More… from 8/14/2001

8/13/2001

“On August 13 [2001], [potential hijacker] Zacarias Moussaoui started his new [flight] training [near Minneapolis, Minnesota]. …Two days later, the school called the local FBI office, telling agents they had what they thought was a potential hijacker on their hands. …By the next afternoon, the FBI was at the school. By nightfall, Moussaoui was in […]

Read More… from 8/13/2001

8/11/2001

“The Washington Post story the next day [August 11, 2001] on page A18 characterized the attack [on air defense sites in Iraq] as one of ‘relatively limited scope’ and business-as-usual. ‘Yesterday’s strikes appeared to continue the Clinton-era pattern of hitting Iraqi air defenses every six months or so.’ “  – Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, […]

Read More… from 8/11/2001

8/10/2001

“On August 10 [2001], US and British jets bombed three air defense sites in Iraq, the largest strikes since February.”  – Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, Page 23 […]

Read More… from 8/10/2001

8/8/2001

President George W. Bush’s comments on decisions being made with the help of the Secretary of Defense: “I’ve got a lot of national security concerns that we’re working on — Iraq; Macedonia, very worrisome right now. Kind of a blowup last night and yesterday it looked like we had a peaceful resolution; it’s now in doubt. […]

Read More… from 8/8/2001

8/7/2001

According to a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief titled, ‘Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US’ on August 7, 2001: “Al-Qa’ida members, including some US citizens, have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure here. Two al-Qa’ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to […]

Read More… from 8/7/2001