9/10/2001

“It was not until Sept. 10 [2001] that [President] Mr. Bush’s national security aides approved a three-phase strategy to eliminate Al Qaeda. The plan, which was to unfold over three to five years, envisioned a mission to the Taliban in Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda was based; increased diplomatic pressure; and covert action. Military strikes might […]

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9/10/2001

Attorney General John “Ashcroft had the bad timing–on September 10 [2001]–of rejecting the FBI’s request for $58 million for 149 new counterterrorism field agents, 200 additional analysts, and 54 extra translators.”  – Gerald Posner, Why America Slept, Page 175 […]

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9/10/2001

On September 10, 2001, the National Security Agency’s “electronic ears picked up two intercepts, both in Arabic, from the al Qaeda plotters. The intercepts disclosed that a major attack was set for the next day. …The discussions were between terrorists in the United States and al Qaeda operatives abroad. With the huge volume of intercepted […]

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9/10/2001

On September 10, 2001, “when the FBI asked Attorney General [John] Ashcroft for an increase of $58 million in its counterterrorism budget, he turned them down. Acting FBI Director Tom Picard was later quoted as saying, ‘Before September 11th, I couldn’t get half an hour on terrorism with Ashcroft. He was only interested in three […]

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9/10/2001

“The intercepts [of al Qaeda plotters, made by the National Security Agency (NSA) on September 10, 2001] were the main reason President Bush so readily pointed to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda as the terrorists who planned and carried out the [9/11] attacks. The intelligence community, through anonymous spokesmen, said analysts were not sure […]

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9/10/2001

On September 12, 2001, Acting Director of the FBI Thomas Pickard received a letter from Attorney General John Ashcroft. “It was a denial of his request for more money for the counter terrorism division. The letter was dated September 10, 2001.”  – Philip Shenon, The Commission, Page 248 […]

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9/10/2001

“On September 10, 2001…two messages in Arabic were intercepted in the course of transmission from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia. Both rang the al-Qaeda bell and were retrieved for translation and analysis. When they were read two days later one said, ‘Tomorrow is zero hour,’ and the other, ‘The match begins tomorrow.’ ”  – Thomas Powers, […]

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9/10/2001

“No president eight months into his term had ever had a lower approval rating in the polls than George W. Bush had on September 10, 2001. Within weeks his approval rating was higher than that ever enjoyed by an American president.”  – Ian S. Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, Page 62 […]

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9/10/2001

“Attorney General John Ashcroft made terrorism a second- or even a third-tier issue, and as late as September 10 [2001], turned down a request from the FBI to increase its counterterrorism budget by $58 million.”  – John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell, Page 297 […]

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9/10/2001

“The FBI issued 216 internal threat warnings about the possibility of an attack by al Qaeda between January [1] and September [10] 2001, while the National Security Agency reported 33 intercepts indicating possible al Qaeda attacks.”  – Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, Page 59 […]

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