9/11/2001

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] immediately invoked Article 5, which meant that all nations that had signed onto the NATO agreement were now joined together in united military operations.”  – Ricardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, Wiser in Battle, Page 143 […]

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9/11/2001

“Within hours of the terror attacks on Sept. 11 [2001], law enforcement officials say, F.B.I. agents intercepted telephone calls in which suspected associates of Al Qaeda in the United States were overheard celebrating the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the following days, the officials said, agents swept in and arrested […]

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9/10/2001

“We have found no indication of any further discussion before September 11 among the President and his top advisers [Since August 6, 2001] of the possibility of a threat of an al Qaeda attack in the United States. DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] Tenet visited President Bush in Crawford, Texas, on August 17 and participated […]

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9/10/2001

From October 2000 until September 10, 2001, “a British banking compliance company had profiles on 15 of them [the 9/11 hijackers] in its files of high-risk people. Banking clients had access to the information, but the profiles evidently were never seen by U.S. agencies that might have spotted something in them to act on. …Swiss […]

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9/10/2001

“…on September 10, 2001, there were fewer FBI agents assigned to counterterrorism than there had been in [August] 1998 at the time of the East Africa embassy bombings.”  – Gerald Posner, Why America Slept, Page 161 […]

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9/10/2001

“It was not until Sept. 10 [2001] that [President] Mr. Bush’s national security aides approved a three-phase strategy to eliminate Al Qaeda. The plan, which was to unfold over three to five years, envisioned a mission to the Taliban in Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda was based; increased diplomatic pressure; and covert action. Military strikes might […]

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9/10/2001

Attorney General John “Ashcroft had the bad timing–on September 10 [2001]–of rejecting the FBI’s request for $58 million for 149 new counterterrorism field agents, 200 additional analysts, and 54 extra translators.”  – Gerald Posner, Why America Slept, Page 175 […]

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9/10/2001

On September 10, 2001, the National Security Agency’s “electronic ears picked up two intercepts, both in Arabic, from the al Qaeda plotters. The intercepts disclosed that a major attack was set for the next day. …The discussions were between terrorists in the United States and al Qaeda operatives abroad. With the huge volume of intercepted […]

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9/10/2001

On September 10, 2001, “when the FBI asked Attorney General [John] Ashcroft for an increase of $58 million in its counterterrorism budget, he turned them down. Acting FBI Director Tom Picard was later quoted as saying, ‘Before September 11th, I couldn’t get half an hour on terrorism with Ashcroft. He was only interested in three […]

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9/10/2001

“The intercepts [of al Qaeda plotters, made by the National Security Agency (NSA) on September 10, 2001] were the main reason President Bush so readily pointed to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda as the terrorists who planned and carried out the [9/11] attacks. The intelligence community, through anonymous spokesmen, said analysts were not sure […]

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