According to the Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005: ” ‘The October [1] 2002 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] reflected the shift from the late-1990s assessments that Iraq could have biological weapons [BW] to the definitive conclusion that Iraq ‘has’ biological weapons, and that its BW program was larger and more advanced […]
Category: quotes
10/1/2002
“[W]hen the Senate Intelligence Committee reviewed the NIE [National Intelligence Estimate of October 1, 2002] in light of evidence that became available after the war, it came to the conclusion that the collective wisdom of the U.S. intelligence community, as represented in the estimate, had been stunningly wrong. ‘Most of the major key judgments [in […]
10/1/2002
“The United States had military commands with responsibility for every part of the world but not for the United States. (Northern Command was created in October [1] 2002 to fill that void.)” – Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor, Page 111 […]
10/1/2002
“Before the war the CIA expressed ‘high confidence’ that once American soldiers had the run of Iraq they would find stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, mobile laboratories to make more, vigorous programs to buy uranium and develop atomic bombs, and much else confronting the United States with a ‘gathering threat’ or ‘growing danger’–words used […]
10/1/2002
“The heart of the [CIA] agency’s case [in their October 1, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate] was built around four factual claims–that Iraq was trying to buy a kind of uranium ore called yellowcake in Niger; that Iraq was trying to buy thousands of aluminum tubes that could be used as rotors in a centrifuge to […]
10/1/2002
In analyzing the NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) completed on October 1, 2002, in terms of its importance to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, then-CIA Director George Tenet wrote: “An NIE had never been relied upon as a basis for going to war, and, in my view, the decision to invade Iraq was not solely predicated […]
10/1/2002
“And the NIE [national intelligence estimate] of October [1] 2002, entitled ‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ stated that Iraq had been ‘vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake’ (the ‘yellowcake’ a reference to the Niger claim). Based partly on this NIE, Congress voted overwhelmingly and across party lines on October 11, […]
10/1/2002
“The October [1] 2002 National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction concluded that Iraq has ‘transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin agents.’ The NIE said it had multiple sources for that assertion, but in fact it was based almost entirely on [Iraqi defector] Curveball.” – James Risen, State of War, Page […]
9/28/2002
“In his weekly radio address [on September 28, 2002], President Bush says the Iraqi regime ‘has longstanding and continuing ties to terrorist groups, and there are Al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq.’ ” – Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold, Page 249 […]
9/28/2002
While pushing for the Homeland Security Bill, President George W. Bush had this to say: “Saddam Hussein has got a choice, and that is, he can disarm. There’s no negotiations, by the way. There’s nothing to negotiate with him. He told the world he would disarm 11 years ago, and he’s lied to the world. (Applause.) It’s […]