“The most important prewar intelligence report that the Bush administration relied upon to justify its going to war in Iraq was the…October 1, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a CIA report that utilized the input of every intelligence agency in the federal government…and was classified ‘Top Secret.’ The NIE report (titled ‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for […]
Category: quotes
10/1/2002
The October 1, 2002 National Intelligence Estimate “claimed that there were multiple sources for the mobile germ warfare claim [in Iraq]. In fact, [Iraqi informant] Curveball had produced scores of reports on this while two other sources produced one report each, so this was a gross misrepresentation. In any event, one of the sources, an […]
10/1/2002
“On Tuesday, October 1 [2002], [President] Bush and [Vice President Dick] Cheney met with a dozen members of the House International Relations Committee in the White House Cabinet Room. ‘We cannot let history judge us and ask where was George W. Bush and Dick Cheney …People out there say you cannot fight in Afghanistan and […]
10/1/2002
” ‘We reject the condescending view that freedom will not grow in the soil of the Middle East–or that Muslims somehow do not share the desire to be free,’ [National Security Advisor] Condoleezza Rice said last October [1, 2002].” – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Page 103 […]
10/1/2002
“The National Intelligence Estimate of October [1] 2002 stated, ‘Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one…’ ” – Philip Taylor, The War in Iraq, Page 48 […]
10/1/2002
The CIA’s October 1, 2002 “National Intelligence Estimate, had been requested in early September by senators on the [Senate Select] committee [on Intelligence] who wanted written information to help them decide whether to vote for the war resolution that would soon be before Congress. In response, the CIA crashed out an assessment in nineteen days–rather […]
10/1/2002
“When the classified assessment [that was requested by October 1, 2002, by vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Senator Bob Graham (D-FL)] was finally submitted, the conclusions about Iraq’s WMD went a step further than those in the December 2000 report [a National Intelligence Estimate titled ‘Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities’]. Much of the […]
10/1/2002
On October 1, 2002, “CIA officials had referred to the [Niger/Iraq] uranium claim in the classified ninety-page National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons programs.” However, “the CIA had included as a footnote to the assessment that the uranium allegations were ‘highly dubious.’ ” – Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, Page 216 […]
10/1/2002
According to the National Intelligence Estimate of October 1, 2002: “The only situation in which Saddam might take the ‘extreme step’ of assisting an Islamic terrorist group like Al Qaeda in attacking the United States would be one in which Saddam had been cornered and felt the United States was on the verge of upending […]
10/1/2002
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of October 1, 2002 said: “that the United States had a ‘high confidence’ that: ‘*Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs contrary to U.S. resolutions. *We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs. *Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles. […]