“At 1:15 P.M. On October 2 [2002], [President] Bush appeared with dozens of lawmakers…in the [White House’s] Rose Garden to announce agreement on a bipartisan resolution.” The resolution was to give Bush the authority to use all means that he determined to be appropriate, including force, to deal with the threat posed by Iraq. “Declaring […]
Category: quotes
10/1/2002
In analyzing the NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) completed on October 1, 2002, in terms of its importance to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, then-CIA Director George Tenet wrote: “An NIE had never been relied upon as a basis for going to war, and, in my view, the decision to invade Iraq was not solely predicated […]
10/1/2002
“And the NIE [national intelligence estimate] of October [1] 2002, entitled ‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ stated that Iraq had been ‘vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake’ (the ‘yellowcake’ a reference to the Niger claim). Based partly on this NIE, Congress voted overwhelmingly and across party lines on October 11, […]
10/1/2002
“The October [1] 2002 National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction concluded that Iraq has ‘transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin agents.’ The NIE said it had multiple sources for that assertion, but in fact it was based almost entirely on [Iraqi defector] Curveball.” – James Risen, State of War, Page […]
10/1/2002
“The most important prewar intelligence report that the Bush administration relied upon to justify its going to war in Iraq was the…October 1, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a CIA report that utilized the input of every intelligence agency in the federal government…and was classified ‘Top Secret.’ The NIE report (titled ‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for […]
10/1/2002
The October 1, 2002 National Intelligence Estimate “claimed that there were multiple sources for the mobile germ warfare claim [in Iraq]. In fact, [Iraqi informant] Curveball had produced scores of reports on this while two other sources produced one report each, so this was a gross misrepresentation. In any event, one of the sources, an […]
10/1/2002
“On Tuesday, October 1 [2002], [President] Bush and [Vice President Dick] Cheney met with a dozen members of the House International Relations Committee in the White House Cabinet Room. ‘We cannot let history judge us and ask where was George W. Bush and Dick Cheney …People out there say you cannot fight in Afghanistan and […]
10/1/2002
” ‘We reject the condescending view that freedom will not grow in the soil of the Middle East–or that Muslims somehow do not share the desire to be free,’ [National Security Advisor] Condoleezza Rice said last October [1, 2002].” – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Page 103 […]
10/1/2002
“The National Intelligence Estimate of October [1] 2002 stated, ‘Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one…’ ” – Philip Taylor, The War in Iraq, Page 48 […]
10/1/2002
The CIA’s October 1, 2002 “National Intelligence Estimate, had been requested in early September by senators on the [Senate Select] committee [on Intelligence] who wanted written information to help them decide whether to vote for the war resolution that would soon be before Congress. In response, the CIA crashed out an assessment in nineteen days–rather […]