10/18/2002

“On October 18 [2002], [National Security Agency (NSA) Director] General [Michael] Hayden went on NSA’s television network to announce that war with Iraq was coming soon and that NSA had to take immediate steps to get ready for the impending invasion. He noted that ‘a SIGINT [signals intelligence] agency cannot wait for a political decision’ […]

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10/17/2002

On October 17, 2002, Director of the National Security Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, “provided Congress and the public with a sobering reality check in testimony before the joint congressional committees on the state of intelligence prior to 9/11. ‘Sadly, NSA [National Security Agency] had no SIGINT [signals intelligence] suggesting that al Qaeda was specifically […]

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10/17/2002

According to Congress’ Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks, testimony of CIA Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer Black on September 26, 2002, and CIA Director George Tenet on October 17, 2002, author Steve Coll wrote: “Bin Laden moved within Saudi intelligence’s compartmented operations, outside of CIA eyesight. CIA archives contain no record of any direct contact […]

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10/17/2002

“CIA Director George Tenet testified under oath [to Congress’ Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks] on October 17, 2002, that during the 1980s, ‘While we knew of him, we have no record of any direct U.S. government contact with bin Laden at that time.’ ”  – Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, Pages 598-599 […]

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10/17/2002

In his prepared testimony before the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002, CIA Director George Tenet made it clear, “that in every case where [then-President Bill] Clinton’s Cabinet discussed cruise missile strikes, a decisive problem was the lack of absolute certainty that bin Laden was present. Tenet concluded that the CIA’s strategy against bin […]

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10/17/2002

“…although terrorism had been NSA’s [National Security Agency’s] top priority since the August 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, the agency’s director, General Michael Hayden, later admitted [before the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on October 17, 2002] that he had at least five […]

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10/17/2002

“Former CIA Director George Tenet has said [on October 17, 2002] that before 9/11, seventy suspected terrorists were rendered, and these actions undoubtedly thwarted a number of plots in the making.”  – Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack, Page 257 […]

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10/17/2002

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “After Bin Ladin had left Sudan we learned that al-Qa’ida had attempted to acquire material used in pursuing a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) capability and had hired a Middle Eastern physicist to work […]

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10/17/2002

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “The US Government had no official presence in Afghanistan, and relations with the Taliban were seriously strained. Both factors made it more difficult to gain access to Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida personnel.”  – CIA, […]

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10/17/2002

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. Regarding surveillance on future 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, it read: “There are at least two points before August 2001 when these individuals were on our scope with sufficient information to have been watchlisted. […]

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