10/17/2002

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “The US Government had no official presence in Afghanistan, and relations with the Taliban were seriously strained. Both factors made it more difficult to gain access to Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida personnel.”  – CIA, […]

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10/17/2002

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. Regarding surveillance on future 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, it read: “There are at least two points before August 2001 when these individuals were on our scope with sufficient information to have been watchlisted. […]

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10/17/2002

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “In the months leading up to 9/11, we were convinced Bin Ladin meant to attack Americans, meant to kill large numbers, and that the attack could be at home, abroad, or both. And we […]

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10/17/2002

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “The Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Board…issued several threat advisories during the summer 2001. These advisories–the fruit of painstaking analytical work–contained phrases like ‘al-Qa’ida is most likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in numerous casualties,’ and […]

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10/17/2002

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It concluded: “Total success against such targets [as al-Qa’ida] is impossible. Some attackers will continue to get through us.”  – CIA, “Written Statement for the Record of the DCI,” (before the Joint Inquiry Committee, CIA), The […]

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10/16/2002

In Iraq, “In October [16] 2002, Saddam got 100 percent of the vote in a nationwide referendum for another seven-year term, which he described as a show of the Iraqi people’s defiance of the US war threats.”  – China Daily Staff, “Profile: Former Iraqi Leader Saddam Hussein,” China Daily, June 30, 2004 […]

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10/16/2002

“Upon signing the congressional resolution [to use force in Iraq] on October 16 [2002], [President] Bush assuaged the fears of those who thought it was a declaration of war. ‘I have not ordered the use of force,’ he said. ‘I hope the use of force will not become necessary. Hopefully this can be done peacefully. […]

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10/16/2002

“On October 16 [2002], Saddam staged a sham referendum on his tenure, which Iraqi officials claimed he won by a perfect 100 percent of the vote…”  – Todd S. Purdum and The New York Times Staff, A Time of Our Choosing, Page 60 […]

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10/16/2002

President George W. Bush, after signing the Iraq Resolution: “When Iraq has a government committed to the freedom and well-being of its people, America, along with many other nations, will share a responsibility to help Iraq reform and prosper. And we will meet our responsibilities. That’s our pledge to the Iraqi people. Like the members of Congress […]

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10/15/2002

“In their effort to win over the Turks [to allow the U.S. to stage a northern front for an Iraq invasion from Turkish soil], the Bush administration had offered the Turks billions. An October [2002] meeting chaired by [National Security Advisor] Condoleezza Rice had settled on a package of $3 billion in aid, $3 billion […]

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