1/15/2003

Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix wrote, in January 2003: “On a visit to a large ammunition store that had been declared by Iraq and had been inspected several times before, our inspectors found a crate of warheads designed for chemical weapons. There were no chemical agents in them, but they should have been declared. […]

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1/15/2003

“The [National Intelligence Council’s] thirty-eight page report [published in January 2003], entitled ‘Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq,’ chronicled a long list of potential problems. …The key judgments of the report are the following: ‘The building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent process with potential for backsliding into Iraq’s tradition […]

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1/15/2003

Regarding the use of enhanced interrogation techniques at Guantanamo, on January 15, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a memo that read: “My December 2, 2002, approval of the use of all Category II techniques and one Category III technique during interrogations at Guantanamo is hereby rescinded. Should you determine that particular techniques in […]

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1/15/2003

“A National Intelligence Council paper in January 2003 titled, ‘Can Iraq Ever Become a Democracy?’ said that ‘Iraqi political culture is so imbued with norms alien to the democratic experience…that it may resist the most vigorous and prolonged democratic treatments.’ ” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – George Tenet […]

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1/15/2003

“On January 15, 2003, Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld rescinded his general approval of these [enhanced interrogation] tactics [which he originally approved for use at Guantanamo on December 2, 2002], leaving open the possibility of specific approval in specific instances, and directed DOD [Department of Defense] General Counsel William Haynes to set up a Department […]

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1/15/2003

In January 2003, an unnamed official in the CIA was told, ” ‘if [President] Bush wants to go to war, it’s your job to give him a reason to do so,’ according to the official. It was the first time the official had ever heard anyone order employees to slant their analysis for political purposes.” […]

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1/15/2003

“The BBC received a Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) document which showed that British intelligence believes there are no current links between the Iraqi regime and the al-Qa’ida network. The classified document, written last month [January 2003], said there had been contact between the two in the past, but it assessed that any fledgling relationship foundered […]

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1/15/2003

“By January 2003, when the Bush administration was ratcheting up its claims of Iraq’s imminent threat, the intelligence reports were continuing to say the exact opposite–that Saddam Hussein had no intention of attacking the United States, unless he was about to be attacked first. The intelligence assessment found that ‘Saddam probably will not initiate hostilities […]

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1/15/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “627. Mr Blair told the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 2003 that ‘the *Issue* was aftermath – the Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine fighting breaking out’.”  – Commissioned by the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP, “The Report of the […]

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1/15/2003

“By January 2003, NSA [National Security Agency] was turning its giant ears toward the undecided members of the UN Security Council. Three months earlier, largely as a result of its avalanche of phony intelligence, the Bush administration won the support of both houses of Congress for a war with Iraq. With the Country largely convinced, […]

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