In January 2003, President Bush “gave the Pentagon the lead responsibility for the management of postwar Iraq. This decision, in the words of one U.S. official, ‘sent out the signal that they [the Pentagon] are really in charge and reinforced and amplified their mandate to say ‘to hell with everybody else.’ “ [The 15th of […]
Category: quotes
1/15/2003
On January 15, 2003, President “Bush met with the war cabinet to hear the details of the planned food relief and other humanitarian efforts [for Iraq]. …’This is an opportunity to change the image of the United States,’ the president said. ‘We need to make the most of these humanitarian aid efforts in our public […]
1/15/2003
“In January 2003, the CIA produced a paper that was the Agency’s definitive take on the [Iraq/al-Qaeda] matter, concluding that there was no Iraqi ‘authority, direction and control’ over al-Qaeda. Deputy Director of the CIA John McLaughlin recalls that this did not go down well with the Bush administration: ‘It took the form of phone […]
1/15/2003
“In January 2003, the National Intelligence Council, a CIA-led panel of intelligence specialists, had cautioned that building democracy in Iraq would be difficult because of its authoritarian history and warned of the risk that the American forces would be seen as occupiers. ‘Attitudes toward a foreign military force would depend largely on the progress made […]
1/15/2003
Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix wrote, in January 2003: “On a visit to a large ammunition store that had been declared by Iraq and had been inspected several times before, our inspectors found a crate of warheads designed for chemical weapons. There were no chemical agents in them, but they should have been declared. […]
1/15/2003
“The [National Intelligence Council’s] thirty-eight page report [published in January 2003], entitled ‘Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq,’ chronicled a long list of potential problems. …The key judgments of the report are the following: ‘The building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent process with potential for backsliding into Iraq’s tradition […]
1/15/2003
Regarding the use of enhanced interrogation techniques at Guantanamo, on January 15, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a memo that read: “My December 2, 2002, approval of the use of all Category II techniques and one Category III technique during interrogations at Guantanamo is hereby rescinded. Should you determine that particular techniques in […]
1/15/2003
“A National Intelligence Council paper in January 2003 titled, ‘Can Iraq Ever Become a Democracy?’ said that ‘Iraqi political culture is so imbued with norms alien to the democratic experience…that it may resist the most vigorous and prolonged democratic treatments.’ ” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – George Tenet […]
1/15/2003
“On January 15, 2003, Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld rescinded his general approval of these [enhanced interrogation] tactics [which he originally approved for use at Guantanamo on December 2, 2002], leaving open the possibility of specific approval in specific instances, and directed DOD [Department of Defense] General Counsel William Haynes to set up a Department […]
1/13/2003
On January 13, 2003, Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar al Sultan met with President Bush. “…the president said that he was receiving advice and reports from some in his administration that in the event of war he [Bush] would have to contend with a massive Arab and Islamic reaction that would put American interests at risk… […]