“On February 2 [2003], the State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] was given another look at [Secretary of State] Colin Powell’s speech [which he was to deliver to the UN on February 5]. This time they found seven items to which they objected. Three of them were removed from the speech. But four […]
Category: quotes
2/1/2003
“By Saturday morning, February 1 [2003], a proposed twenty-five page script on Saddam’s purported connections with terrorists had arrived–a compilation of material that had been prepared by [Undersecretary of Defense Douglas] Feith’s office… After [Secretary of State Colin] Powell reviewed the new terrorism section, he pulled [his Chief of Staff Larry] Wilkerson off to a […]
1/31/2003
“President Bush hosted [Tony] Blair at the White House again on January 31, 2003. Blair said they needed a second UN resolution- one that made it clear that an invasion of Iraq was the only answer. (Resolution 1441 had not done this.) Many British people were opposed to the war, and Blair might lose the […]
1/31/2003
“By the end of January 2003, the [War College] Strategic Studies Institute produced a report that noted that ‘ethnic, tribal and religious schisms could produce civil war or fracture the state [Iraq] after Saddam is deposed.’ ” Additionally, ” ‘The possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq is […]
1/31/2003
“On January 31 [2003], the State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research], which had been vetting the work-in-progress draft [for Secretary of State Colin Powell’s upcoming UN Speech], sent Powell a memo noting that thirty-eight allegations in the speech were ‘weak’ or ‘unsubstantiated.’ …Since not all of the INR’s objections were heeded, Powell would […]
1/31/2003
“On January 31 [2003], [President] Bush met with [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair in the Oval Office for two hours. Blair had a request. He explained to Bush that he needed a second UN resolution that explicitly authorized military action against Iraq. …Bush told Blair that regardless of what happened at the United Nations or […]
1/31/2003
President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on January 31, 2003. “Blair told Bush that he needed to get a second UN resolution [authorizing military action against Iraq]. …Bush was set against a second resolution. …But Blair had the winning argument. It was necessary for him politically. It was no more complicated than […]
1/31/2003
While the U.S. and the U.K. were pushing for a second UN resolution to condemn Iraq, “the president [Bush] was certain that war was inevitable. During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan. 31, 2003, he made clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade Iraq […]
1/31/2003
“The memo, written [by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning] on 31 January 2003, almost two months before the invasion [of Iraq] and seen by the Observer, confirms that as the two men [President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair] became increasingly aware UN inspectors would fail to find weapons of mass destruction […]
1/31/2003
The leaked memo written by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning on January 31, 2003, discussed that day’s meeting between President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair. “The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr. Bush […]