Following Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address to the U.N. on February 5, 2003, Vice President Dick “Cheney wanted to give his own speech making the charge [of Iraq seeking yellowcake uranium in Niger]. [CIA Director George] Tenet was upset. …The CIA intelligence does not support the conclusion of Cheney’s proposed speech, he said [to […]
Category: quotes
2/5/2003
” ‘I cannot tell you everything that we know,’ he [Secretary of State Colin Powell] began after a brief introduction [in his speech before the U.N Security Council on February 5, 2003]. ‘But what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling.’ The […]
2/5/2003
In his address to the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell said: ” ‘There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. …Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. …We have more than a decade of proof that Saddam Hussein […]
2/5/2003
By early February [2003], the British were ready to deliver a report to the Americans. [MI6 (British Foreign Intelligence) Chief] Richard Dearlove flew to Washington to present the report to [CIA Director George] Tenet. …The report stated that according to [Iraqi informant and Intelligence Chief Tahir Jalil] Habbush, Saddam had ended his nuclear program in […]
2/5/2003
” ‘We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more,’ [Secretary of State Colin] Powell said in closing [in his speech to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003]. ‘Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given […]
2/4/2003
“On February 4 [2003], [Les, the Defense Department doctor who had examined Curveball] sent an email to the deputy chief of the CIA’s Joint Task Force on Iraq: ‘I do have a concern with the validity of the information based on ‘CURVE BALL.’ He noted there had been…questions about whether ‘in fact, CURVE BALL was […]
2/4/2003
According to information from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, delivered on July 7, 2004: “On the day before Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address before the UN Security Council [February 4, 2003]…a [anonymous] military intelligence officer became alarmed that Powell was relying […]
2/3/2003
On February 3, 2003, “When Les, the Defense Department medical doctor and biological weapons specialist detailed to the CIA’s Counterproliferation Division, read a draft of [Secretary of State Colin] Powell’s [upcoming] speech [to the UN Security Council], he was upset. He had gone to Germany in 2000 to draw blood from [Iraqi informant] Curveball [whose […]
2/3/2003
“On February 3, 2003, the White House press spokesman, Ari Fleischer, responded to a question about the president’s [Bush’s] views on the exile of Saddam: ‘Well, as the president said, if Saddam Hussein were to leave Iraq and to take, as the President put it, his henchmen with him, that would be a very desirable […]
2/3/2003
“On February 3 [2003], two days before [Secretary of State Colin] Powell was to go to New York, he sketched out his briefing to the president [Bush] at an NSC [National Security Council] meeting. ‘We have sources for everything,’ Powell confidently told the President. If Powell felt duped or misled about any aspect of his […]