“On February 2 [2003], the State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] was given another look at [Secretary of State] Colin Powell’s speech [which he was to deliver to the UN on February 5]. This time they found seven items to which they objected. Three of them were removed from the speech. But four […]
Category: quotes
2/1/2003
“By Saturday morning, February 1 [2003], a proposed twenty-five page script on Saddam’s purported connections with terrorists had arrived–a compilation of material that had been prepared by [Undersecretary of Defense Douglas] Feith’s office… After [Secretary of State Colin] Powell reviewed the new terrorism section, he pulled [his Chief of Staff Larry] Wilkerson off to a […]
1/31/2003
“On January 31 [2003], the State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research], which had been vetting the work-in-progress draft [for Secretary of State Colin Powell’s upcoming UN Speech], sent Powell a memo noting that thirty-eight allegations in the speech were ‘weak’ or ‘unsubstantiated.’ …Since not all of the INR’s objections were heeded, Powell would […]
1/31/2003
“On January 31 [2003], [President] Bush met with [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair in the Oval Office for two hours. Blair had a request. He explained to Bush that he needed a second UN resolution that explicitly authorized military action against Iraq. …Bush told Blair that regardless of what happened at the United Nations or […]
1/31/2003
President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on January 31, 2003. “Blair told Bush that he needed to get a second UN resolution [authorizing military action against Iraq]. …Bush was set against a second resolution. …But Blair had the winning argument. It was necessary for him politically. It was no more complicated than […]
1/31/2003
While the U.S. and the U.K. were pushing for a second UN resolution to condemn Iraq, “the president [Bush] was certain that war was inevitable. During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan. 31, 2003, he made clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade Iraq […]
1/31/2003
“The memo, written [by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning] on 31 January 2003, almost two months before the invasion [of Iraq] and seen by the Observer, confirms that as the two men [President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair] became increasingly aware UN inspectors would fail to find weapons of mass destruction […]
1/31/2003
The leaked memo written by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning on January 31, 2003, discussed that day’s meeting between President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair. “The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr. Bush […]
1/31/2003
On January 31, 2003, President Bush “had a two hour meeting in the Oval Office with British prime minister Tony Blair and six of Bush’s and Blair’s top aides. …In a five-page memo stamped ‘extremely sensitive’ dated January 31, 2003, that summarized the discussion at the meeting…[Blair’s Chief Foreign Policy Advisor, David] Manning wrote that […]
1/31/2003
The leaked memo written by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning on January 31, 2003 discussed that day’s meeting between President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair. “Without much elaboration, the memo also says the president raised three possible ways of provoking a confrontation. …’The U.S. was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft […]