2/2/2003

“On February 2 [2003], the State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] was given another look at [Secretary of State] Colin Powell’s speech [which he was to deliver to the UN on February 5]. This time they found seven items to which they objected. Three of them were removed from the speech. But four […]

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2/1/2003

“By Saturday morning, February 1 [2003], a proposed twenty-five page script on Saddam’s purported connections with terrorists had arrived–a compilation of material that had been prepared by [Undersecretary of Defense Douglas] Feith’s office… After [Secretary of State Colin] Powell reviewed the new terrorism section, he pulled [his Chief of Staff Larry] Wilkerson off to a […]

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1/31/2003

While the U.S. and the U.K. were pushing for a second UN resolution to condemn Iraq, “the president [Bush] was certain that war was inevitable. During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan. 31, 2003, he made clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade Iraq […]

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1/31/2003

“The memo, written [by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning] on 31 January 2003, almost two months before the invasion [of Iraq] and seen by the Observer, confirms that as the two men [President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair] became increasingly aware UN inspectors would fail to find weapons of mass destruction […]

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1/31/2003

The leaked memo written by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning on January 31, 2003, discussed that day’s meeting between President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair. “The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr. Bush […]

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1/31/2003

On January 31, 2003, President Bush “had a two hour meeting in the Oval Office with British prime minister Tony Blair and six of Bush’s and Blair’s top aides. …In a five-page memo stamped ‘extremely sensitive’ dated January 31, 2003, that summarized the discussion at the meeting…[Blair’s Chief Foreign Policy Advisor, David] Manning wrote that […]

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1/31/2003

The leaked memo written by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning on January 31, 2003 discussed that day’s meeting between President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair. “Without much elaboration, the memo also says the president raised three possible ways of provoking a confrontation. …’The U.S. was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft […]

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1/31/2003

On January 31, 2003, while seeking help in monitoring the ‘Middle Six’ countries on the UN Security Council who were undecided in regards to invading Iraq, “Frank Koza, the [National Security Agency’s (NSA’s)] Sigint [signals intelligence] department’s deputy chief of staff for Regional Targets, sent a Top Secret/Codeword memo to the NSA’s Five Eyes partners […]

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1/31/2003

On January 31, 2003, U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Washington D.C. “to tell [President] Bush that the British needed a second [UN] Security Council resolution citing the failure of Saddam to comply with demands that he disarm and explicitly authorizing military action. Bush, impatient, insisted that the first resolution, 1441, already sanctioned the use […]

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1/31/2003

“[T]he State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] fact-checked an early draft of [Secretary of State Colin] Powell’s speech [which he was to deliver to the U.N. on February 5, 2003]. On January 31 [2003]…they sent a memo to Powell asserting that thirty-eight allegations in the speech were ‘unsubstantiated’ or ‘weak.’ As a result […]

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