2/2/2003

“On February 2 [2003], the State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] was given another look at [Secretary of State] Colin Powell’s speech [which he was to deliver to the UN on February 5]. This time they found seven items to which they objected. Three of them were removed from the speech. But four […]

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2/1/2003

“By Saturday morning, February 1 [2003], a proposed twenty-five page script on Saddam’s purported connections with terrorists had arrived–a compilation of material that had been prepared by [Undersecretary of Defense Douglas] Feith’s office… After [Secretary of State Colin] Powell reviewed the new terrorism section, he pulled [his Chief of Staff Larry] Wilkerson off to a […]

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1/31/2003

” ‘After September the 11th, the doctrine of containment just doesn’t hold any water, as far as I’m concerned,’ is how President Bush characterized the new stance in a [January 31, 2003] news conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain a few weeks before the war [in Iraq] began.”  – Todd S. Purdum […]

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1/31/2003

From the Chilcot inquiry, the British public inquiry into their involvement in the war in Iraq: “One of [Prime Minister Tony] Blair’s notes is believed to relate to a two-hour White House meeting with [President] Bush on 31 January 2003. A memo written by Sir David Manning, Blair’s chief foreign policy adviser and stamped ‘extremely […]

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1/31/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary:” “Mr Blair and President Bush meet in Washington.”  – Commissioned by the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary,” IraqInquiry.org.uk, Jan. 31, 2003 […]

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1/31/2003

“President Bush hosted [Tony] Blair at the White House again on January 31, 2003. Blair said they needed a second UN resolution- one that made it clear that an invasion of Iraq was the only answer. (Resolution 1441 had not done this.) Many British people were opposed to the war, and Blair might lose the […]

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1/31/2003

“By the end of January 2003, the [War College] Strategic Studies Institute produced a report that noted that ‘ethnic, tribal and religious schisms could produce civil war or fracture the state [Iraq] after Saddam is deposed.’ ” Additionally, ” ‘The possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq is […]

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1/31/2003

“On January 31 [2003], the State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research], which had been vetting the work-in-progress draft [for Secretary of State Colin Powell’s upcoming UN Speech], sent Powell a memo noting that thirty-eight allegations in the speech were ‘weak’ or ‘unsubstantiated.’ …Since not all of the INR’s objections were heeded, Powell would […]

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1/31/2003

“On January 31 [2003], [President] Bush met with [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair in the Oval Office for two hours. Blair had a request. He explained to Bush that he needed a second UN resolution that explicitly authorized military action against Iraq. …Bush told Blair that regardless of what happened at the United Nations or […]

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1/31/2003

President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on January 31, 2003. “Blair told Bush that he needed to get a second UN resolution [authorizing military action against Iraq]. …Bush was set against a second resolution. …But Blair had the winning argument. It was necessary for him politically. It was no more complicated than […]

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