2/5/2003

After being held in a floating prison in the Indian Ocean, alleged al Qaeda leader Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi “was sent to Egypt for additional interrogation to extract a confession. Under torture, he gave a statement that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and provided training to al Qaeda. …In his address to the UN Security […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003

2/5/2003

“Working from a draft prepared by [Vice President Dick] Cheney’s office, [Secretary of State] Colin Powell made the tubes [made of anodized aluminum, which Iraq was supposedly attempting to acquire to use for uranium enrichment] a centerpiece of his speech in the UN Security Council on Feb. 5, 2003, ridiculing the notion that anyone would […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003

2/5/2003

Secretary of State Colin “Powell was set to go before the United Nations on February 5, 2003, to make the WMD intelligence case for war, and [Vice President Dick] Cheney wanted him to look at the argument his chief of staff, Scooter Libby, had assembled charging a link between Saddam and al Qaeda. Powell…refused to […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003

2/5/2003

A British Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS) document, which was leaked in early February 2003, “indicated that British intelligence believed there were no current links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda and that any contact between officials in the Iraqi regime and the al-Qaeda network yielded nothing due to reciprocal mistrust and incompatible ideologies.” [The 5th of […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003

2/5/2003

“Speaking before the United Nations [on February 5, 2003], Secretary of State Colin Powell, citing intelligence gathered from an Iraqi source, said that a bin Laden associate ‘had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gasses.’ ”  – Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Laden, Page 238 […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003

2/5/2003

Following Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address to the U.N. on February 5, 2003, Vice President Dick “Cheney wanted to give his own speech making the charge [of Iraq seeking yellowcake uranium in Niger]. [CIA Director George] Tenet was upset. …The CIA intelligence does not support the conclusion of Cheney’s proposed speech, he said [to […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003

2/5/2003

” ‘I cannot tell you everything that we know,’ he [Secretary of State Colin Powell] began after a brief introduction [in his speech before the U.N Security Council on February 5, 2003]. ‘But what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling.’ The […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003

2/5/2003

In his address to the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell said: ” ‘There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. …Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. …We have more than a decade of proof that Saddam Hussein […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003

2/5/2003

By early February [2003], the British were ready to deliver a report to the Americans. [MI6 (British Foreign Intelligence) Chief] Richard Dearlove flew to Washington to present the report to [CIA Director George] Tenet. …The report stated that according to [Iraqi informant and Intelligence Chief Tahir Jalil] Habbush, Saddam had ended his nuclear program in […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003

2/5/2003

” ‘We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more,’ [Secretary of State Colin] Powell said in closing [in his speech to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003]. ‘Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given […]

Read More… from 2/5/2003