7/7/2004

According to information in the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, delivered July 7, 2004: “Far from being an imminent threat, Iraq had become little more than a hollow shell. By 1999, the intelligence community viewed Saddam Hussein as a washed-up dictator with a […]

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7/7/2004

The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, delivered July 7, 2004, “put the greatest portion of the blame for the intelligence disaster on the doorstep of CIA Director George J. Tenet, who decided, after having viewed drafts of the Senate report the month before, […]

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7/7/2004

On July 7, 2004, General Counsel of the U.S. Navy, Alberto Mora “finished writing an extraordinary twenty-two page memo chronicling his wide-ranging and persistent efforts in the winter of 2002 to push the Pentagon back from an official policy of cruelty [regarding detainee interrogation]. The memo…was marked secret and kept from public view.”  – Jane […]

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7/7/2004

From information in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s July 7, 2004, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq: “In a statement where [Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Pat] Roberts [R-KS] was joined by Republican senators Christopher S. Bond [MO] and Orrin G. Hatch [UT], he wrote: ‘In an interview with Committee […]

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7/7/2004

Based on claims made by the October 1, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate, “NSA’s [National Security Agency’s] analysis of intercepts in 2002 was correct…in warning that Iraq was in the process of producing a ‘large-diameter missile,’ which meant a regular ballistic missile with booster rockets attached to it that would give the missile a range far […]

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7/7/2004

The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq was delivered on July 7, 2004. On the subject of Iraq attempting to procure uranium from Niger, it read: ” ‘U.S. Embassy Niamey [Niger] disseminated a cable on a recent meeting between the ambassador and the Director General […]

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7/7/2004

On July 7, 2004, General Counsel of the U.S. Navy Alberto Mora wrote a memo to the Inspector General of the Navy, which read: “In contrast to the civilian law enforcement personnel present at Guantanamo, who were trained in interrogation techniques and limits and had years of professional experience in such practices, the military interrogators […]

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7/7/2004

On July 7, 2004, “the DOD [Department of Defense] established the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), which in theory gave each Guantanamo detainee notice of the factual basis for his detention and classification as an enemy combatant. CSRT determinations of enemy combatant status and prosecutions of detainees at Guantanamo commenced under the Military Commissions Act […]

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7/1/2004

“The first appearance of Saddam before a magistrate to initiate some sort of formal legal process occurred on Thursday, July 1, 2004–two days after sovereignty was returned to Iraq. Saddam was in the legal custody of Iraq, but the U.S. Army still provided physical custody.”  – Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, Page 409 […]

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6/30/2004

In Iraq, on June 30, 2004, “the Coalition formally transferred its authority over the former regime’s leaders, whom it held in custody, to the new Interim Government. The defendants themselves continued to be held by the Coalition in various prisons, mainly at Camp Victory near the Baghdad airport.”  – Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of […]

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