According to a Reuters article on July 13, 2004: “John McLaughlin, who had stepped in as acting head of the CIA after George Tenet’s departure, told a congressional panel that the terror threat leading up to the November [2004] elections was ‘as serious a threat environment as I have seen since 9/11.’ ” – Peter […]
Category: quotes
7/13/2004
9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh “Mohammed provided the CIA with an autobiographical statement, describing a rebellious childhood, his decision to join the Muslim Brotherhood as a teenager, and his time in the United States as a student at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, from where he graduated in 1986 with a degree in mechanical […]
7/10/2004
According to a New York Times article on July 10, 2004: “Senator Jay Rockefeller [D-WV], the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, flatly stated that if he had known then what he knows now, he would not have voted for the war resolution that sent so many U.S. troops into harms way [in Iraq] [sic].” […]
7/9/2004
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSIC) Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, dated July 7, 2004, “noted that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) ‘focused its terrorist activities on western interests, particularly against the U.S. and Israel.’ According to the SSIC report: ‘The CIA summarized nearly 50 intelligence reports as […]
7/9/2004
“As the CIA noted at the time [in the July 9, 2004, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq], ‘[I]t would be difficult for al-Qaida to maintain an active, long-term presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or obtaining their acquiescence.’ ” – Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, Page 446 […]
7/9/2004
“On July 9, 2004, the FBI’s Office of Inspections distributed an e-mail asking its agents who were stationed at Guantanamo whether they had witnessed, ‘Aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques…which were not consistent with FBI interview policy/guidelines.’ More than two-dozen agents responded that they observed numerous instances of detainee abuse. One FBI agent wrote that, […]
7/9/2004
“[O]n July 9 [2004], the Senate intelligence committee released a devastating 511-page report that chronicled the missteps, miscalculations, and shoddy judgments of the U.S. intelligence community prior to the war. The report concluded that the CIA and other agencies had succumbed to unfounded ‘groupthink’ assumptions in determining that there had been weapons of mass destruction […]
7/9/2004
“The [Senate Intelligence Committee] report [released on July 9, 2004] reaches 117 separate conclusions about the October 2002 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] and other matters relating to prewar intelligence about Iraq, and it is fair to say that almost every one contains a more or less stinging rebuke of the CIA. The report does not […]
7/9/2004
The Senate Intelligence Committee’s July 9, 2004 report of the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published in October 2002, said the aluminum tubes Iraq allegedly tried to buy from China were “cited as evidence of Iraq’s determination to build nuclear weapons. …The Department of Energy in particular argued in great detail that the tubes were […]
7/9/2004
On July 9, 2004, “the National Intelligence Council issued a paper, still classified, which warned of the possibility that Iraq would collapse into civil war. The best-case scenario, the council said, would be a ‘tenuous stability’; rosier hopes were dropped from the paper as unrealistic.” – Thomas Powers, The Military Error, Page 51 […]