9/30/2004

The Iraq Survey Group released the Duelfer Report on September 30, 2004. It concluded: ” ‘Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capacity–which was essentially destroyed in 1991–after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilised, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability–in an […]

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9/30/2004

“According to the senior officials the ISG [Iraq Survey Group] interviewed, the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons. They went on to say [in the Duelfer Report, on September 30, 2004]: ‘ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate […]

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9/30/2004

“[A]s the final weapons inspections report by [Iraq Survey Group leader] Charles Duelfer concluded [on September 30, 2004], ‘Saddam wanted to re-create Iraq’s WMD capability…after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized.’ “  – George W. Bush, Decision Points, Page 270 […]

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9/30/2004

“In the closing stages of the 2004 presidential campaign [September 30, 2004], President Bush claimed that ’75 percent of known al Qaeda leaders have been brought to justice.’ Yet when reporters pressed the White House for documentation to support that number, they were stonewalled. Asked about this figure, senior terrorism analysts from the CIA, the […]

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9/30/2004

In the first presidential debate on September 30, 2004, President Bush said: “Because of the U.S. invasion of Iraq… ‘Saddam Hussein now sits in a prison cell. America and the world are safer for it.’ ”  – Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Bin Laden’s Legacy, Page 58 […]

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9/30/2004

“Years later, after Saddam’s overthrow, the American-British-Australian Iraq Survey Group (ISG) investigated Iraq’s WMD history.” On September 30, 2004, “The ISG’s American head, Charles Duelfer, confirmed that ‘Iraq’s interest in camel pox and its inclusion in the viral BW [biological weapons] program have led ISG to assess that camel pox R&D was a surrogate for […]

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9/30/2004

In his report made on September 30, 2004, Iraq Survey Group leader Charles Duelfer reported: ” ‘With the bulk of Iraq’s BW [biological weapons] program in ruins, Iraq after 1996 continued small-scale BW-related efforts with the only remaining asset at Baghdad’s disposal–the know-how of the small band of BW scientists and technicians who carried out […]

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9/30/2004

In his report made on September 30, 2004, Iraq Survey Group leader Charles Duelfer reported: ” ‘The [Iraqi] Regime quickly came to see that OFF [the Oil-for-Food program] could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development. By 2000-2001, […]

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9/30/2004

In his report made on September 30, 2004, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) leader Charles Duelfer reported: ” ‘[B]etween 1991 and 1996 Iraq possessed an expanding BW [biological weapons] agent production capability. From 1996 to OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] [March 20, 2003], Iraq still possessed small but significant dual-use facilities capable of conversion to small-scale BW […]

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9/30/2004

In his report made on September 30, 2004, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) leader Charles Duelfer reported: ” ‘ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations.’ ”  – Douglas Feith, War and […]

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