“Working with his former political science student at Yale[,] Scooter Libby, and [Deputy Undersecretary for Policy Planning] Zalmay Khalilzad, [Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul] Wolfowitz came up with a radical, visionary, and highly controversial forty-six page classified document [on February 18, 1992] known as the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). (The document is also sometimes referred to as the Defense Policy Guidance paper and as the Wolfowitz doctrine.) ‘Paul Wolfowitz believed then that it was a mistake to end the [first Gulf] War,’ said [Defense Policy Board Advisor] Richard Perle. ‘They underestimated the way in which Saddam was able to cling to power, and the means he would use to remain in power. That was the mistake.’ ”
– Craig Unger, The Fall of the House of Bush, Page 116