



STRATEGY  
AND  
RESOURCES

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PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

18 FEB 1992

In reply refer to:  
I-91/28291

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION  
COMPTROLLER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: FY 94-99 Defense Planning Guidance Sections for Comment (U)

(U) Attached for your review and comment is the draft FY 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance. Please provide your response by COB Friday, February 21st.

(U) We ask that you focus your comments on major substantive concerns, and encourage you to highlight those you deem of greatest importance. Also, please recognize that this draft is probably at about the desired length and level of detail; therefore, lengthy inserts are unlikely to be workable. Finally, we ask that you consider both the policy and program planning implications of the overall guidance in your comments. It is very important that the guidance be fiscally realistic.

(U) We envision the DPG including these sections, plus an illustrative planning scenario appendix. To facilitate handling of future DPG-related drafts and documents, please identify a member of your staff as a single point of contact; OUSD/Policy contacts are Mr. Andrew Hoehn (Policy and Strategy section) and Mr. Rod Fabrycky (Programming section), 1C469, x79478. By prior arrangement the Joint Staff (J-8) will provide this package to the CINCs and assemble and forward their responses.

Dale A. Vesser (Acting)

Attachment:

a/s

cc:

- Chief of Staff of the Army
- Chief of Naval Operations
- Chief of Staff of the Air Force
- Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

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Classified by: ADUSD/R&P  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED DEC 10 2007  
Authority: EO 12958, as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

18 February 1992

**Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999**

(S) This Defense Planning Guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression-- the first post-Cold War conflict and a defining event in US global leadership. In addition to these two victories, there has been a less visible one, the integration of Germany and Japan into a US-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic "zone of peace."

(U) Our fundamental strategic position and choices are therefore very different from those we have faced in the past. The policies that we adopt in this new situation will set the nation's direction for the next century.

**I. Goals and Objectives (U)****A. National Security Policy Goals (U)**

(S) In the midst of a new era of fundamental worldwide change, ongoing U.S. leadership in global affairs will remain a constant fixture. In support of our international commitments, we will implement defense policies and programs designed to further essential national security policy goals:

- As a first order of priority, we will ensure the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- We will seek to promote those positive trends which serve to support and reinforce our national interests, principally, promotion, establishment and expansion of democracy and free market institutions worldwide.
- We will maintain our security vigilance against national, regional or global threats (whether ideologically- or technologically-based) which undermine international stability and order.
- We will continue to support and protect those bilateral, multilateral, international or regionally-based institutions, processes and relationships which afford us opportunities to share responsibility for global and regional security while also allowing for selective engagement when and where required.

**B. Defense Strategy Objectives (U)**

(U) These national security policy goals can be translated into two broad strategy objectives that lend further clarity to our overall defense requirements.

(S) Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.

(S) There are three additional aspects to this objective: First, the US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. An effective reconstitution capability is important here, since it implies that a potential rival could not hope to quickly or easily gain a predominant military position in the world.

(S) The second objective is to address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law; limit international violence; and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems. These objectives are especially important in deterring conflicts or threats in regions of security importance to the United States because of their proximity (such as Latin America), or where we have treaty obligations or security commitments to other nations. While the US cannot become the world's "policeman," by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of US interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; threats to US citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict; and threats to US society from narcotics trafficking.

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Authority: EO 12958, as amended  
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II. Defense Policy and Strategy (U)


A. Trends and Prospects in the International Environment (U)

1. Soviet Threat Reduction (U)

(S) Central to these new objectives is clear recognition that we no longer will focus on the threat of a short-warning Soviet-led, European-wide conflict leading quickly to global war and perhaps escalating just as quickly to nuclear war. We continue to recognize that collectively the conventional forces of the states formerly comprising the Soviet Union retain the most military potential in all of Eurasia; and we do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others. However, for the foreseeable future the continued fragmentation of the former Soviet state and its conventional armed forces have altered so fundamentally the character of the residual threat as to eliminate the capacity to wage global conventional war or even to threaten East/Central Europe without several months of warning. A limited objective attack against Western Europe appears beyond Russia's capabilities without several years of reconstitution. Further erosion of the former Soviet defense industrial base and continued evolution of separate national armies will make the likelihood of a future attack even more remote.

2. Increasing Regional Challenges (U)

(S) As the threat posed by the defunct Soviet Union decreases in magnitude, other threats become more important in the context of defense planning. In most cases, this is because they appear greater relative to the residual Soviet/Russian threat and thus are more likely to drive actual requirements. In other cases these threats may have become greater in absolute terms because of the end of the Cold War. Some regional powers, freed of the constraints of the Cold War, may feel more entitled for historical, cultural or other reasons to use of force to establish local hegemonies --although the decisive nature of our victory in the Persian Gulf will hopefully discourage such actions.



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OSD 1.4 (C)

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(S) The disintegration of the Soviet Union also affects the dynamics of low-intensity conflict. We no longer have the Soviets fueling and exploiting low-intensity conflict to the detriment of US security. However, the demise of the Soviet Union has not put an end to destabilizing national and ethnic antagonisms in regions where the US has important security interests. Regional actors determined to pursue anti-American agendas may choose to use indirect and unconventional means. Moreover, there are trans-national security problems such as drug trafficking and terrorism which, along with unfavorable demographic and economic trends, undermine the security of the US, friendly governments and emerging democracies.

(S) Clearly, the passing of the Cold War reduces pressure for US military involvement in every potential regional or local conflict. Indeed, absent a global ideological challenge, we have opportunity to exercise far greater selectivity in our commitments, to rely more heavily on multilateral efforts to resolve regional or local crises that do not directly threaten our interests, and to draw more fully on non-military instruments as a means of conflict resolution. This applies in a variety of conflict situations. Nevertheless, if current trends hold, it is clear that DoD may be called upon during the FY 1994-1999 period to respond to regional challenges. The nature of that response may vary from humanitarian assistance to "presence" or peacekeeping missions to the use of force. In most cases, it is likely that the

US will not be acting alone, but will be part of multinational coalitions, possibly under the auspices of the UN or other international organizations. Thus, DoD must have the capability to act flexibly in conjunction with coalition partners, some of whom may not be traditional partners or allies. While enabling us to build down to lower force levels, this calls attention to forward presence and crisis response capabilities as the new basis for planning.

**3. Proliferation (U)**


(U) The proliferation of advanced weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction, poses a different challenge. Proliferation can take many forms and can include state and non-state actors. It might embody specific types of technology, including technologies necessary for the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons along with their means of delivery; it can also include a full array of ground, sea, and air platforms and supporting command and control systems necessary for the execution of successful combined arms operations. Moreover, proliferation increasingly will include the means of producing advanced weapons, either through original development or licensed production of new systems, or reverse engineering of existing or copied systems. Proliferation cannot be limited in context to major regional powers either; several smaller or lesser powers or even non-state actors are likely to possess advanced weapons and technologies that have potential to disrupt operations or substantially increase the risks to a military operation. Even the presence of relatively old technology, which will in fact characterize the vast majority of cases, can represent a tremendous challenge, as evidenced by the Iraqi use of short-range missiles in the Gulf War.




**4. Warning Considerations (U)**

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


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5. New Military Technical Regime (U)

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
OSD 1.4 (a)

(U) We must maintain superiority in key areas of technology, but this does not mean we must maintain absolute superiority in all areas of technology. It is critical, therefore, that we identify the highest leverage technologies and pursue these with vigor. Staying ahead of potential competitors will help shape the future security environment by giving us capabilities to deter future aggressors as well as the capacity to reconstitute forces as necessary.



6. Alliances, Coalitions and Responsibility Sharing (U)

(2) Our alliances will continue to provide an essential component of our national security structure. The US will maintain and nurture its alliance commitments in Europe, Latin America and in the Far East. Unlike the period of the Cold War, however, the US will play a qualitatively new role in these relationships --the role of leader and galvanizer of the world community. As alliance partners acquire more responsibility for their own defense, the US will confidently be able to reduce its air, land, and naval force commitments overseas without incurring significant risks. As these changes occur, however, they must be managed carefully to ensure that they are viewed as a new expression of responsibility sharing with our regional partners, rather than mistakenly perceived by either allies or potential adversaries as a withdrawal of US commitment.




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
(c) In the new international environment, leadership in responding to threats to world order will, in some cases, be taken by others, such as international or regional organizations. We must recognize, accept, and encourage this reality. Nevertheless, the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary presage to a larger or more formal collective response. This requirement will affect the type and level of presence we maintain in key areas of the world to offset the potentially destabilizing effect that emerging powers may have in a region.

OSD 1.4 (a)

7. Arms Control (U)







OSD 1.4 (a)

**B. The Regional Defense Strategy**

(U) The regional defense strategy marks officially the passing of the Cold War era. It retains the enduring character of our strategic deterrent posture while placing new emphasis on forward presence and crisis response as the basis for the decisive application of military power. It is an adaptive strategy that aims to leverage US military potential in a changing security environment. It is a strategy that will shape the reduction of US military forces by maintaining attention on those core activities necessary to advance US security interests.

(U) On the broadest level, the regional defense strategy recognizes that we cannot ignore our enduring interests or neglect our responsibilities in key regions of the world. To do so will only invite danger, foster instability, and, ultimately, require a greater commitment of resources in the future. We remain committed to maintaining the strength of the NATO alliance, as well as our other alliances and friendships; to deterring and, when necessary, defending against threats to our security and interests; and to exercising the leadership needed, including the decisive use of military forces when necessary, to maintain a world environment where societies with shared values can flourish. We see also that we have opportunity to provide for our security at less risk than in previous eras, but we must do so while staying focused on the balance between risk and opportunity, maintaining only that capability necessary to secure our nation's interests.

(U) In defense terms, this strategy requires an effective strategic deterrent capability, including strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces and strategic defenses. It necessitates a robust and capable forward presence of air, ground, and naval forces, although reduced significantly from earlier levels and changed in many instances to reflect basing arrangements and reasonable expectations concerning force availability. Further, the new strategy requires the ability to act quickly and decisively with a range of options against regional or local threats on short notice with modern, highly capable forces. It requires also that we remain mindful of future or emerging threats by providing the wherewithal to reconstitute additional forces, if necessary, or to refocus investment priorities to offset the challenge of a resurgent global threat or general remilitarization of the international environment.

## 1. Strategic Deterrence

(U) Deterring nuclear attack remains the highest defense priority of the nation, even though the threat of strategic attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the political collapse of the Soviet Union. Strategic nuclear forces are essential to deter use of the large and modern nuclear forces that Russia will retain even under a modified START regime and implementation of the nuclear initiative announced by the President Gorbachev in the fall of 1991. Our nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of a revitalized or unforeseen global threat, while at the same time helping to deter third party use of weapons of mass destruction through the threat of retaliation.


(U) The START agreement, signed in July 1991, imposes equal aggregate ceilings on the strategic offensive arsenals of both countries, with reductions are carried out in three phases over seven years after the treaty enters into force. After the seven year implementation period, each country will be allowed 1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and no more than 6,000 accountable warheads. The four republics of the Commonwealth where nuclear forces remain and declared START-related facilities are located --Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan-- have all declared their intent to observe and implement START treaty obligations.

(U) The President's unilateral initiatives September 1991, which reduced the alert status of 45 percent of our ICBM launchers, took the bomber force off alert, and removed naval nonstrategic nuclear forces from our fleets, encouraged the former Soviet Republics with nuclear weapons to reduce their force levels and go to lower states of alertness. In addition, in his State of the Union Address, the President announced major reductions in our strategic modernization programs. These reductions in, and changes to the Base Force reflect confidence that we can achieve deterrence at levels below those agreed in START.

(U) Notwithstanding continued modernization of Russian offensive forces, positive changes in our relationship with the Commonwealth states and the fundamental changes in Eastern Europe have all but eliminated the danger of large-scale war in Europe that could escalate to a strategic exchange. At the same time, the threat posed by the global proliferation of ballistic missiles and by an accidental or unauthorized missile launch resulting from political turmoil has grown considerably. The result is that the United States, our forces, and our allies and friends face a continued and even growing threat from ballistic missiles.

(U) The Gulf War raised the specter of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation and their delivery by missiles from hostile and irresponsible states like Iraq. A secure

retaliatory capability should deter their use by a rational enemy but does not protect against accidental, miscalculated or irrational use. The President called upon Russian leaders in his September speech to join in taking "immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited missile strikes --whatever their source."



OSD 1.4 (a)

(U) It is possible that Russian nuclear weapons would no longer pose a threat to the United States and its allies sometime in the future. This would require unambiguous evidence of a fundamental reorientation of the Russian government: institutionalization of democracy, positive ties to the West, compliance with existing arms reduction agreements, possession of a nuclear force that is non-threatening to the West (with low numbers of weapons, no MIRVed ICBMs, and not on high alert status), and possession of conventional capabilities that are not threatening to neighbors. It is far from clear whether it will be possible to achieve this objective. As a result, we continue to face the possibility of robust strategic nuclear forces in the hands of those who might revert to closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Hence, our efforts must leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations.

(U) In the decade ahead, we must find the right combination of offensive forces while creating the proper balance between offense and defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction from any source. For now this requires retaining the readiness of our remaining strategic offensive forces. In addition, we must complete the offensive modernization and upgrades for the forces we have retained. These offensive forces need to be complemented with early introduction of an appropriately sized GPALS system.

## 2. Forward Presence (U)


(U) The regional defense strategy emphasizes the criticality of maintaining US presence abroad, albeit at reduced levels. This is another enduring, though newly refined principle of US security

policy. In the new strategy forward presence provides a key basis for sizing active and reserve forces.

(U) The historic success of our forward presence strategy-- and the critical need to continue it for the future--should carefully be recognized. US forward presence forces send an unmistakable signal to allies and adversaries alike of our enduring commitment to a region. It helps prevent the emergence of dangerous vacuums that have potential to incite historical regional antagonisms or suspicions and which fuel arms races and proliferation or tempt would-be regional and local aggressors-- especially in this era of fragile and changing regional balances. Forward presence is critical to maintaining a strong network of relationships, to helping shape the future strategic environment in ways favorable to our interests, and to positioning us favorably to respond to emerging threats. It supports our aim of continuing to play a leadership role in international events.

(U) Forward forces also provide a capability for initial rapid response to regional and local crises or contingencies that may arise with little or no warning. Indeed, our forward forces should increasingly be capable of fulfilling multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional roles, rather than deterring in a more limited sense by being trained and prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. These capabilities will require high degrees of readiness and availability, which means generally those capabilities resident in the active forces, for the reduced levels of forward presence that we maintain. It also will require a more flexible lift posture to be capable of moving forces to areas where they are most needed.

(e) Forward basing, of necessity, must become more flexible to accommodate changing regional configurations and to allow for a more dynamic character in our alliance relationships.




(C) Europe is experiencing fundamental transformation. In security terms, the challenge of a Soviet-inspired Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe has disappeared, and the countries of Eastern Europe are seeking to reposition themselves back into the larger political and economic fabric of Europe. They have been joined more recently by several states of the former Soviet Union. A substantial American presence in Europe and continued cohesion within the western Alliance remain vital. This presence will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe and possibly some of the former Soviet Union are integrated into a larger and evolving security architecture. American presence will also allay Western European concerns as it seeks a new identity through integration and possibly the emergence of a common foreign and security policy. While its

OSD 1.4 (e)

mission may be changed in this new era, the North Atlantic Alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability in the region. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the ongoing withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and force reductions associated with the CFE accord allow us to scale back our presence significantly to a smaller, but still militarily meaningful contribution to NATO's overall force levels, [REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (A)



(U) In the Persian Gulf region, as an aftermath of the Gulf War, traditional maritime presence, including carrier battle group presence. We will focus on substantially upgraded strategic lift and mobility to improve contingency response time and permit rapid deployment to the region; more prepositioning of munitions and materiel in-theater through additional maritime prepositioned forces or POMCUS provided by friendly states; increased ABM defenses; and improved in-theater command, control, and communications. Longer-term US presence in the region will depend upon a host of factors, including the evolving regional balance and the prospects for a lasting Middle East accord. The Persian Gulf region will remain vital to US interests for the indefinite future indicating an enduring requirement to maintain long-term presence in the theater, both ashore and afloat.


(U) In other regions, as the need for our military presence continues or as we see that some new or additional form of



presence might introduce a new level of stability, we will increasingly rely on periodic visits of air, ground, and naval forces, training missions, access agreements, prepositioned equipment, exercises, combined planning and security, and humanitarian assistance. These more subtle but no less important forward presence operations most tangibly reflect the evolving commitment of US military forces that we can expect in a dynamic global environment. This implies a more fluid role for our presence forces rather than an appreciable increase to the overall level of activity. Indeed, absent a global challenge, we might broadly anticipate a general decline in the overall level of activity recognizing a more selective use of military forces in overseas missions.

(U) Finally, as we reduce our forward presence, we must remain mindful that there exists no reliable mechanism for evaluating precisely the exact levels of forward presence necessary to promote our objectives. Reductions in forward presence involve risks, and precipitous actions may produce unanticipated and highly costly results from which it is very difficult to recover. The potential for increased risks can take several forms, not all necessarily related to decreases in our presence, but they certainly can be exacerbated by lack of attention in this area. Planned reductions should be undertaken slowly and deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as necessary.

### 3. Crisis Response (U)




OSD 1.4 (a)

(U) The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of our the regional defense strategy and also a principal determinant of how we size our active and reserve forces. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. One trait most share, however, is that they have potential to develop on very short notice. These conditions require highly responsive military forces available with little or no notice, a role best suited to the active

component. Over time we must have the capability to respond initially to any regional contingency with combat and most support forces drawn wholly from the active component, except for a limited number of support and mobility assets. Reserve forces will be responsible primarily for supporting and sustaining active combat forces and for providing combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the US capability to respond to another sizeable regional or local contingency.


(U) As we learned from the Gulf War, a regional crisis can also mean mounting a very large military operation against a well armed, highly capable adversary. Proliferating unconventional threats of ballistic missiles and chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons raise further the specter of risk. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including effective forcible entry capabilities, remain key elements of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges. We must be ready to deploy a broad array of capabilities, including heavy and light ground forces, tactical aviation forces, naval and amphibious forces, and special operations forces.



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


(U) US forces must be able to conduct operations supportive of global humanitarian and stability objectives, including disaster relief, refugee assistance, non-combatant evacuations, counter-narcotics, and peacekeeping. The NATO Rome Summit imparted special significance to joint disaster relief and peacekeeping activities between NATO and former Warsaw pact members.





(C) Ultimately, crisis response capabilities depend on our ability to secure the global posture necessary for timely regional action. This demands that all forward presence forces be structured in a way to support major regional crises, even outside their traditional theaters of operation. OSD 1.4 (a)

4. Reconstitution




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
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**C. Regional Threats and Risks**




(U) To appreciate the applicability and relevance of our strategy to specific regional situations requires a more detailed analysis of the linkages and cross-currents within and among various regions. This also requires a more complete discussion of how the regional defense strategy will accomplish its dual mission of both protecting U.S. national interests and concurrently sustaining our commitment to stability and order in a complex, interrelated world.


**1. Former Soviet Union (U)**



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


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


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2. Western Europe (U)



OSD 1.4 (a)



3. East/Central Europe (U)

OSD 1.4 (a)


(S) The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have gone a long way toward increasing stability and reducing the military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of democratic reformers in the Russian Republic, should this process continue, is likely to create a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe.



OSD 1.4 (a)


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OSD 1.4 (a)

4. East Asia/Pacific (U)



OSD 1.4 (a)






OSD 1.4 (a)

(S) We must endeavor to curb proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures, but we must avoid proposals that would erode U.S. naval strength critical to our forward deployed posture. We need better intelligence yielding improved strategic warning to permit us to benefit from greater economy of force. We should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking.

5. Middle East and Southwest Asia (U)




OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)


We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of

defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire capabilities such as anti-tank weapons, integrated air defense systems, and improved intelligence and communications systems.



OSD 1.4 (G)

(S) The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the risk of future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons, slow the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.




OSD 1.4 (G)

(S) The presence of drug production and trafficking in Southwest Asia complicates our relations with regional countries. We will support the efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade..

#### 6. Latin America and the Caribbean (U)

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the US seeks a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of US security policy is assisting nations in the region against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, while fostering the development of democratic institutions. In addition, the US must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit

narcotics, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.



OSD 1.4 (a)

(U) Countering drug trafficking remains a national security priority of the Department of Defense. Our programs must be geared toward attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the US. In particular, we need to help stabilize and bolster the counter-insurgency capabilities of the government of Peru, which is facing a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency. DOD is the lead federal agency for detection and monitoring of drug traffic destined for the United States. Our programs must therefore

provide the capability to detect the flow of drugs from source countries to the US, and for providing that information via secure communications to enforcement agencies.


7. Sub-Saharan Africa (U)



OSD 1.4 (a)

D. Reconstitution (U)

(U) With the demise of the Cold War global threat, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that the potential global-scale reconstitution threats to our security are now very distant--so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision.



OSD 1.4 (a)

[REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (a)

(S) Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new antagonistic superpower or some emergent alliance of hostile regional hegemons. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy must refocus on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of any potentially hostile entity that could pursue strategic aims of region-wide or global domination in competition with the U.S. and our allies.

[REDACTED]


OSD 1.4 (a)

[REDACTED]

(U) For the near- and long-term, reconstitution strategy will require that we take care to preserve in adequate measure the longest-lead elements of our overall security posture: alliance structures, forward deployments and access; the advantages in both military technology and doctrine that come from vigorous innovation and development; the high quality of our military personnel pool; and our military core competencies.

[REDACTED]


OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (G)

(U) Force reconstitution includes activities analogous to the three "phases" of graduated mobilization response activity (peacetime planning and preparations, measured responses to a crisis, and large scale force expansion). However, reconstitution strategy subsumes and expands upon such established concepts and capabilities as full and total mobilization and graduated mobilization response. The potential of reconstituting new types of forces is one such difference. We should investigate innovative reconstitution measures that may become increasingly useful in the future, such as new types of more producible but militarily useful equipment (and accompanying doctrines), and abilities to rapidly move next-generation systems into production. Also, reconstitution focusses on the opportunity we now have to reduce our defense establishment--active and reserve units, industrial capacity, etc.--in ways that take advantage of our past investments by retaining access to some of those long-lead elements of our capacity to build back up. We can retain some equipment of disestablished units in laid-up or cadre-type status, lay away military production capabilities, and tap the pool of trained personnel exiting units but still accessible in reserve manpower categories.

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OSD 1.4 (a)

**E. Strategy Foundations (U)**

(U) Our ability to implement the regional defense strategy will depend on preserving our technological superiority, quality personnel, core military competencies, and a robust alliance structure. Once lost, these foundations would take a very long time to rebuild --at least a generation. Our alliances, once lost, may never be regained.



1. Technological Superiority (U)


(U) Technological superiority was critical to our success in the Persian Gulf. A primary goal of our defense programming is to maintain that superiority in key areas in the face of reductions in force structure and the current defense industrial base, and in a global environment of technological proliferation. Our programs through the end of the FY1994-1999 period must be focused on two key objectives:

- Relentless pursuit of technological innovation; and,
- Operational experimentation with and fielding of these innovations by the Base Force as part of our strategy for the reconstitution of future forces.



OSD 1.4 (A)

(U) Robust research and development alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. The best technology in the world cannot alone win battles. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems produced in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need to be able to fight future forces before we buy them. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real R&D prototyping on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges and competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field, and if we are to concurrently develop the joint doctrine necessary to employ our combined forces. We must create incentives and eliminate disincentives for the defense industry to invest in new processes, facilities and equipment as well as in R&D. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines.



2. Quality Personnel (U)

OSD 1.4 (A)

(U) The Gulf War demonstrated that the quality of our military personnel is the key factor in success in war. The success of the Base Force concept will depend on our ability to


attract and retain the best qualified personnel through an appropriate incentive structure as we transition to lower force levels. The US military will attain the Base Force force structure by FY 1995. In the subsequent years, we will seek to preserve the quality of our force at a level 25 percent lower than in FY 1990 in what may be an austere budgetary environment. Continued efforts will be required to terminate unneeded programs; close, coordinate or realign military bases; streamline our defense infrastructure and procedures; and maintain a proper balance between active and reserve forces.

**3. Core Competencies (U)**


(U) Core competencies are the leadership, doctrine, and skills needed to retain mastery of critical warfare capabilities. Retaining the lead in core military competencies will be a high defense priority for the FY 1994-1999 period.

**F. Attaining National Security Goals with the Regional Defense Strategy (U)**

(U) The Regional Defense Strategy seeks to protect American interests and promote a more stable and democratic world. The objectives of the strategy are two. First, ensuring that a hostile power does not dominate a critical area of the world, including Western Europe, East Asia, Southwest Asia, or Russia or mount a global challenge. Second, the strategy seeks to achieve enduring US security interests, such as protecting the US from direct attack, ensuring the security of our borders and nearby regions, maintaining access to world markets, protecting our citizens overseas, and meeting our political and moral commitments. The new strategy seeks to achieve these goals through alliance relationships, forward presence, and crisis response capabilities.



OSD 1.4 (a)

  
III. Programming for the Base Force

OSD 1.4 (a)


## A. Introduction

1. (U) Purpose. This section constitutes definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense for formulation of the FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda. It is to be used in conjunction with the FY 94-99 Fiscal Guidance published by the Secretary on 15 February 1992. This section establishes minimum military capabilities to be provided within available resources to support national objectives and strategy.

2. (C) Overall Program Priorities. In making the difficult decisions necessary to formulate the defense program in the current strategic and fiscal environment, the Department must maintain effective strategic deterrence; continue adequate though reduced levels of forward presence; provide robust capabilities for regional crisis response; and provide reconstitution capabilities to forestall or counter any future global challenger. Under current plans, force structure reaches minimum acceptable "base force" levels (for strategic forces, crisis response forces, and forward presence levels alike) by around FY 1995 for most areas of the force, so we must give priority to retaining adequate levels of force structure. Under no circumstances, however, will we maintain a larger structure than we can support with levels of readiness (training, manning, and equipping) adequate for deterrence and timely crisis response. Sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of crisis response operations is also imperative. For modernization, both strategic and conventional, a profound slowing in modernization by the formerly program-driving Soviet threat enables a new acquisition strategy, focussed on selected research and advanced development to keep our qualitative edge in systems and doctrine, with greatly reduced emphasis on procurement.

## B. Strategic Forces

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OSD 1.4 (a)

2. (S) Defensive. Within a refocused SDI program, develop for deployment defensive systems able to provide the U.S., our forces overseas, and our friends and allies global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source. Also, pursue complementary capability against bombers and cruise missiles.



OSD 1.4 (a)

(S) Ensure that strategic and theater defense systems, as well as offensive and defensive systems, are integrated.

C. Conventional Forces and Forward Presence

(O) Program for base force levels as follows while meeting readiness and sustainability guidance and remaining compliant with arms control agreements. However, do not preserve force structure at the cost of leaving forces undermanned, under-trained, or under-equipped.

(U) Required military personnel will be maintained in that component of the Total Force -- active or reserve -- in which they can maintain required readiness and effectively accomplish required missions at the least cost. The various components will operate cohesively in peacetime and in wartime in their respective roles as an integrated and effective Total Force. Forces for forward presence (including an associated CONUS rotation base) and combat forces for response to regional crises and contingencies must be predominantly in the active components. Reserve

components' contingency roles will focus primarily on providing mobility and selected critical support for initially deploying forces; increasing increments of support forces for continuing and expanding deployments; and increasing increments of combat forces as well, especially for large, protracted and/or concurrent contingencies.

1. Army.




OSD 1.4 (a)


- (S) Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with combat support capability and a base for reception and onward movement.
- (S) Retain one heavy division (-) in Korea, including associated support.

2. Navy/Marine Corps.

- (S) Program for 12 carrier battlegroups based on a force of 12 aircraft carriers (plus one training carrier) and 13 airwings (11 AC/2 RC). Program about 150 major surface combatants and about 70 attack submarines as part of the battle group complement and for various other missions. Maintain sufficient ASW, surveillance and combat logistic support forces.
- (C) Program for 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces including 6 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (5 AC/1 RC). Program for amphibious lift for 2.5 MEBs.



OSD 1.4 (a)



3. Air Force.

OSD 1.4 (a)

- (C) Program for 26.5 TFWs (15.25 AC/11.25 RC, including recce/EW). Maintain sufficient tanker and CONUS air defense forces.




4. Special Operations Forces.



OSD 1.4 (a)


D. Mobility and Prepositioning

(U) Program for the mobility and prepositioning requirements found in the Secretary of Defense-approved recommendations of the recent Mobility Requirements Study (MRS).



OSD 1.4 (a)

- 2. (S/NF) Sealift (Navy). Acquire through new construction or conversion in U.S. shipyards large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships (which, plus the current SL-7 fast sealift ships, will provide the capability to surge 2 heavy divisions from CONUS), and ships for enhancement of the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). Provide readiness enhancements for the RRF





Also, implement

the Merchant Mariner Reserve program.

OSD 1.4 (a)

3. Prepositioning:





OSD 1.4 (a)

- ~~(S/AF)~~ Navy/Marine Corps: acquire through new construction or conversion in U.S. shipyards 9 ships for afloat prepositioning providing at least 2 million square feet of capacity for Army combat equipment (at least a heavy brigade equivalent) and support. Support the current 3 Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons.


4. (U) CONUS Infrastructure (Army). Program CONUS infrastructure improvements per the approved MRS recommendations, including a West Coast containerized ammunition facility and capabilities to move units "from fort to port."

**E. Readiness**

(U) Forward Presence and Crisis Response requirements preclude any broad reductions in readiness, given short warning times for regional threats, but readiness must be higher for certain missions and forces than for others, as reflected below. Under no circumstances will we maintain a larger force structure than we can support with adequate levels of readiness.

(C) Readiness programming will reflect the "first to fight" principle. Specifically, priorities among units for providing resources to maintain manning, training and equipment readiness will be based, regardless of component, on each unit's peacetime roles and the most demanding of its deployment time(s) for the contingencies depicted in the Illustrative Planning Scenarios at Annex A.

1. ~~(S)~~ Readiness Levels. Program resources necessary to maintain unit readiness levels as follows:



OSD 1.4 (a)



[REDACTED]

Reserve component reinforcing forces associated with these AC forces (i.e. associated roundout and support units) will maintain similar readiness ratings.

- Other RC combat forces, and their associated support forces, will maintain readiness levels commensurate with their contingency missions.

2. (U) Personnel Quality. Maintaining the high quality of U.S. military personnel is a strategic imperative, but will involve particular difficulties during the large reduction in the size of the force. Structure and resource robust recruitment and retention programs at levels expected to maintain roughly current high levels for the major aggregate personnel quality indicators across the force. Provide adequate resources for military institutions of higher education.

3. (U) Training. Place increased emphasis on joint and combined exercises that stress interoperability, joint warfighting doctrine, and rapid deployment (including to prepositioned materiel). Increase emphasis on use of simulators in training to most efficiently provide a well-trained force.

4. (U) Maintenance. Do not permit Intermediate and Depot maintenance unfunded requirements (as adjusted for programmed force reductions) to exceed levels in the FY 93-97 defense program. Retain sufficient core maintenance infrastructure to sustain future programmed forces after initial deployment.

## F. Sustainability

### 1. War Reserve Inventories.

(c) For the near term, and particularly with an eye to recovering our sustainability posture from the demands of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and taking advantage of lessons learned in that operation, objectives are to (1) fix sustainability assets that are reparable, (2) make the best distribution of available assets, and (3) procure mission essential critical items with proven war reserve deficiencies that directly impact warfighting capabilities. (For munitions, the Conventional Systems Committee - Munitions is responsible for identifying such mission critical items and providing appropriate recommendations.)

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2. Industrial Surge

OSD 1.4 (a)


(C) Program for Industrial Preparedness Measures that would permit surge production of munitions, critical troop support items and spares where this is a cost-effective alternative to maintaining a full complement of war reserve inventories for meeting a portion of the above guidance, and short-notice need is a real possibility (e.g., airlift spares). Program the capability for stated support and spares surge and mobilization requirements for each major defense acquisition program achieving Milestone III during the program period.



OSD 1.4 (a)


G. Modernization and Investment

1. New Acquisition Strategy.




OSD 1.4 (G)

b. (U) R&D Emphasis. These requirements and resources will warrant moving programs through full-scale development and procurement much less often, or at least less than immediately. Nevertheless, maintaining our technological edge in both potential military technology and fielded systems will remain a strategic imperative. To replace the private sector R&D for which follow-on procurement profits were once the sure incentive, we will increase emphasis on government-supported R&D as necessary to support our technology base. We will emphasize taking the time to prototype systems and prove out concepts before proceeding, and greatly reduce concurrency in the stages of the acquisition process. We will also increase emphasis on system producibility and on manufacturing processes.



OSD 1.4 (G)

OSD 1.4 (a)




e. (U) Full Funding. Ongoing and any new acquisition programs will be funded fully in accordance with the baseline approved by the DAB. In particular, the Program Objective Memoranda will fully reflect any agreements between the Defense Acquisition Executive and a Military Department Secretary that resulted from the Under Secretary for Acquisition's and the Deputy Secretary's affordability initiative.

2. Defense-Wide Investment Programs.

a. (U) Science and Technology:

(U) Each Military Department and DARPA shall fund the science and technology program (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a, exclusive of SDI funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1992 President's Budget. In devising the S&T program, take into account the potential European and Japanese contributions.

(C) Balance the S&T program between (1) a core of broad sustaining programs, and (2) the following specific thrusts which contribute directly to high priority defense needs:

- Global surveillance and communications, focused on a theater of operations with sufficient fusion and planning assets.
- 
- All-weather air superiority and defense against very low observable cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and aircraft.
- Sea control and undersea superiority against open ocean, coastal and regional threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and stealthy cruise missiles, and by undersea mine warfare.
- Rapidly deployable, survivable, and lethal all-weather day/night ground combat capability.
- Training and readiness including embedded training, distributed simulation and virtual environment depiction.
- Integration of warfighting and training requirements with manufacturing and production technology, aimed at rapid prototyping and efficient low volume production.

OSD 1.4 (a)

b. (U) Manufacturing Technology Program. Program not less than zero percent real growth per year from a baseline predicated upon the FY 1991 funding level. ManTech technical priorities should be based upon thrust areas identified in the National Defense Manufacturing Technology Plan.

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
c. (U) Test and Evaluation: In the FY 94-99 program:

- Fund test capability investment needs (6.5 and related 6.4 and 7.8 funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1992 President's Budget.
- Reduce operating and maintenance costs for new T&E capabilities by 15% when compared to similar existing capabilities.
- Optimize investment strategy to support the high priority defense technology thrusts identified above.
- Enhance susceptibility, vulnerability and lethality assessment programs for combat systems and munitions.

d. (U) Facilities. Installations not required to support the reduced force levels will not be retained. Accordingly, plan to resource new facility investment and backlog reduction only at those "core" installations which have a very high probability of retention through future Base Closure and Realignment Commission processes. Confine investment at non-core installations to that required to address life/safety and environmental conditions. In allocating resources for facility investments and maintenance give priority to supporting essential readiness and high-priority RDT&E areas as reflected in the guidance above.

3. Force Modernization Programs

a. Strategic Deterrence



OSD 1.4 (a)

(1) (U) Offensive Forces.



OSD 1.4 (a)

[REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (a)

(2) (U) Defenses. Program for the following, consistent with a refocussed SDI program:

[REDACTED]

b. Conventional Forces.

OSD 1.4 (a)

(1) (U) International Cooperation. Ongoing and new acquisition programs will look to international participation to offset risk, reduce cost, and enhance alliance ties.

(2) (S) Mission Area Priorities. Assessment of programmed contingency capabilities, and evaluation of Persian Gulf War


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experience, indicate the following high-priority areas of critical investment needs:

- Deployable anti-armor: air-deployable ground force mobility and anti-armor capabilities for enhanced immediate tactical flexibility (e.g. motorized light armor with beyond-line-of-sight anti-tank weaponry).
- Tactical C3I: better and more survivable day/night reconnaissance and target identification capabilities (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles); enhanced Army/Air Force tactical intelligence interoperability (e.g., Air Force acquisition of JSTARS data line ground stations); enhanced theater and tactical communications and intel dissemination systems, and associated procedures, that are interoperable, more flexible and capable of supporting joint and combined operations.
- Identification Friend or Foe (IFF): enhanced air/land battle IFF systems, for both air-to-ground and ground-to-ground applications (also, joint exercises to refine interoperability procedures).
- Aero-space campaign: improved Air Force/Navy/Marine tactical air operations integration and joint planning systems and procedures; improved tactical intelligence dissemination; increased ability, including munitions stocks, for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft to use precision guided munitions against ground targets, during day or night and in all weather, to an extent comparable to other Services.
- Anti-mine: good naval and land mine clearance capability (including rapid minefield location systems and improved killing mechanisms), with emphasis on mine countermeasures for support of amphibious operations, particularly in shallow water and beach landing areas, and on capability for offensive use of advanced land and naval mines as force multipliers.
- Chemical/biological: improved chemical and biological detection and warning systems (ground vehicles and air recon), protection systems (individual and collective) and medical support and decontamination systems; and consideration of CB effects in development of equipment that may be used in a CB environment; also necessary are implementation of expected CW agreements and destruction of chemical munitions.




- Anti-tactical ballistic missile: (see guidance in the OSD 1.4 (a) strategic sections).

**H. Reconstitution Capability**

**1. General Principles.**

(U) Overall resource allocation should give priority to base force capabilities and to preserving such longest-lead elements of security as alliances, technology, and quality personnel. Also, the defense program includes many elements that are needed for forces in being but provide latent potential for reconstitution, and must be evaluated accordingly. Still, modest but high-leverage investment in reconstitution-specific programs will be important.

(U) Extant active and reserve units would be available to take part in deterring or responding to any threat that might also require reconstitution. Such units (particularly the RC) would require "generation" measures to bring them to combat readiness. Additional new forces beyond these could be created from "regeneration" assets, industrial/technology base assets, and manpower assets.




OSD 1.4 (a)

**b. Industrial/Technology Base Assets.**

(U) Industrial Planning/Preparedness: Maintain robust production base analysis and industrial preparedness planning to support reconstitution. Prepare plans as required with industry to start or restart production for reconstitution, including appropriate industrial preparedness measures, and procurement rules/practices to be waived. Reconstitution will not be a predominant factor in deciding to maintain production of a major platform; however, the production restart time for reconstitution will often be a consideration in deciding the long-term shutdown status.

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
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c. Manpower Assets.


OSD 1.4 (a)

(2) For early reconstitution efforts, plan to use reassigned active component personnel and Selected Reserve annual training or volunteers. Plan and prepare for maximum reliance on increased recruiting and retention (including additional civil service support personnel, and keeping increased numbers of exiting personnel in recallable categories).

(3) For relatively rapid reconstitution, plan for use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Plan for maximum recall and use of retired military personnel to man and train reconstituting units and for other needs. Use annual IRR screening and training authority to ensure IRR availability.



[Redacted]



OSD 1.4 (a)

- 2 reserve component cadre divisions, each with a full heavy division equipment set and about 20% SelRes O&M and manning (including minimal necessary full-time support), focussed on long-lead maintenance and leadership cadre;
- Equipment exiting active or reserve units and placed in long-term storage;
- Industrial production restart capability, including if appropriate lay-away of production facilities and perhaps component stockpiling or other industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for M1A1)




OSD 1.4 (a)

b. (S) Naval Forces:

using the most cost-effective combination of:

- The Innovative Naval Reserve of 32 frigates supported by 8 training frigates with full-time support/training crews and augmentation/nucleus crews
- The training carrier, backfilled in the training role by a deactivated but recallable carrier within an acceptable time
- Other ships in inactive but recallable status



c. (S) Air Forces:

using the most cost-

effective combination of:

OSD 1.4 (a)

- Airplanes exiting active or reserve units and placed in inviolate storage;
- Production restart capability, including if appropriate lay-away of production facilities and perhaps industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for F-16, F-117)

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- Particularly for airlift/tanker squadrons, innovative measures perhaps involving dual-use and/or refitable airframes, possibly in a civil reserve status.

d. (s) Support and Training: Program for selected cadre-type support units (particularly non-divisional support units) or storage of support equipment if/as necessary for timely support to reconstituting combat units; however, wherever possible plan to draw support assets from the civil sector or defense production base, using resources made available in response to strategic warning. For expanding the training base for reconstitution, identify and if necessary program selected assets; however, plan to rely primarily on assets that could be made available quickly, e.g. retired military personnel, and laid-away bases or other DoD or non-military U.S. or allied land and facilities.

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