5,433. 10/15/2003

“In October 2003, a major study on the insurgency, embodied in a US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), concluded that the insurgency was driven by local factors, and that it drew its strength from deep grievances and a widespread hostility to the presence of foreign troops. This came on the heel of a steady flow of intelligence reports that the insurgency was becoming rooted and spreading. But the Bush administration policymakers, who continued to repeat their conviction that the violent resistance was the work of former regime elements and foreign jihadis, essentially ignored the NIE. Robert Hutchings, then chairman of the National Intelligence Council, said, ‘Frankly, senior officials simply weren’t ready to pay attention to analysis that didn’t conform to their own optimistic scenarios.’ ” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, Pages 186-187

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