Based on claims made by the October 1, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate, “NSA’s [National Security Agency’s] analysis of intercepts in 2002 was correct…in warning that Iraq was in the process of producing a ‘large-diameter missile,’ which meant a regular ballistic missile with booster rockets attached to it that would give the missile a range far […]
7/7/2004
From information in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s July 7, 2004, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq: “In a statement where [Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Pat] Roberts [R-KS] was joined by Republican senators Christopher S. Bond [MO] and Orrin G. Hatch [UT], he wrote: ‘In an interview with Committee […]
7/7/2004
On July 7, 2004, General Counsel of the U.S. Navy, Alberto Mora “finished writing an extraordinary twenty-two page memo chronicling his wide-ranging and persistent efforts in the winter of 2002 to push the Pentagon back from an official policy of cruelty [regarding detainee interrogation]. The memo…was marked secret and kept from public view.” – Jane […]
7/7/2004
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, delivered July 7, 2004, “put the greatest portion of the blame for the intelligence disaster on the doorstep of CIA Director George J. Tenet, who decided, after having viewed drafts of the Senate report the month before, […]
7/7/2004
According to information in the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, delivered July 7, 2004: “Far from being an imminent threat, Iraq had become little more than a hollow shell. By 1999, the intelligence community viewed Saddam Hussein as a washed-up dictator with a […]
7/7/2004
According to information from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, delivered July 7, 2004, “With regard to the most important intelligence assessments, such as the question of whether Saddam Hussein actually possessed mobile biological-weapons laboratories, sought aluminum tubes for nuclear weapons, or was […]
7/7/2004
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released the Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq on July 7, 2004. “The unanimous 511-page report concluded that the intelligence put forth by the agency [CIA] to justify going to war was both unfounded and unreasonable. It painted a picture of a dysfunctional organization […]
7/7/2004
According to the U.S. Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, published on July 7, 2004: ” ‘After 1998, the CIA had no dedicated unilateral sources in Iraq reporting on Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical program; indeed, the CIA had only a handful of Iraqi assets […]
7/1/2004
“The first appearance of Saddam before a magistrate to initiate some sort of formal legal process occurred on Thursday, July 1, 2004–two days after sovereignty was returned to Iraq. Saddam was in the legal custody of Iraq, but the U.S. Army still provided physical custody.” – Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, Page 409 […]
6/30/2004
In Iraq, on June 30, 2004, “the Coalition formally transferred its authority over the former regime’s leaders, whom it held in custody, to the new Interim Government. The defendants themselves continued to be held by the Coalition in various prisons, mainly at Camp Victory near the Baghdad airport.” – Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of […]