7/9/2004

“The [July 9] 2004 report on prewar intelligence of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said that the CIA’s conclusions in the October [1] 2002 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] classified report on Iraq’s illicit weapons were ‘either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting.’ (The committee gave, as examples, the CIA saying […]

Read More… from 7/9/2004

7/9/2004

On July 9, 2004, “the National Intelligence Council issued a paper, still classified, which warned of the possibility that Iraq would collapse into civil war. The best-case scenario, the council said, would be a ‘tenuous stability’; rosier hopes were dropped from the paper as unrealistic.”  – Thomas Powers, The Military Error, Page 51 […]

Read More… from 7/9/2004

7/9/2004

The Senate Intelligence Committee’s July 9, 2004 report of the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published in October 2002, said the aluminum tubes Iraq allegedly tried to buy from China were “cited as evidence of Iraq’s determination to build nuclear weapons. …The Department of Energy in particular argued in great detail that the tubes were […]

Read More… from 7/9/2004

7/9/2004

“The [Senate Intelligence Committee] report [released on July 9, 2004] reaches 117 separate conclusions about the October 2002 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] and other matters relating to prewar intelligence about Iraq, and it is fair to say that almost every one contains a more or less stinging rebuke of the CIA. The report does not […]

Read More… from 7/9/2004

7/9/2004

“[O]n July 9 [2004], the Senate intelligence committee released a devastating 511-page report that chronicled the missteps, miscalculations, and shoddy judgments of the U.S. intelligence community prior to the war. The report concluded that the CIA and other agencies had succumbed to unfounded ‘groupthink’ assumptions in determining that there had been weapons of mass destruction […]

Read More… from 7/9/2004

7/8/2004

“…Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security [Tom Ridge] warned on July 8 [2004], that al-Qaeda was planning a large terrorist attack on the United States ‘in an effort to disrupt the democratic process.’ “  – Ian S. Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, Page 107 […]

Read More… from 7/8/2004

7/8/2004

“…Homeland Security head Tom Ridge had amped up fears just days earlier [in early July 2004] by announcing that al Qaeda was planning a major attack on the United States this year. ‘What we know about this more recent information is that it is being directed from the seniormost levels of the Al Qaeda operation,’ […]

Read More… from 7/8/2004

7/7/2004

On July 7, 2004, “the DOD [Department of Defense] established the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), which in theory gave each Guantanamo detainee notice of the factual basis for his detention and classification as an enemy combatant. CSRT determinations of enemy combatant status and prosecutions of detainees at Guantanamo commenced under the Military Commissions Act […]

Read More… from 7/7/2004

7/7/2004

On July 7, 2004, General Counsel of the U.S. Navy Alberto Mora wrote a memo to the Inspector General of the Navy, which read: “In contrast to the civilian law enforcement personnel present at Guantanamo, who were trained in interrogation techniques and limits and had years of professional experience in such practices, the military interrogators […]

Read More… from 7/7/2004

7/7/2004

The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq was delivered on July 7, 2004. On the subject of Iraq attempting to procure uranium from Niger, it read: ” ‘U.S. Embassy Niamey [Niger] disseminated a cable on a recent meeting between the ambassador and the Director General […]

Read More… from 7/7/2004