10/8/1997

“In the report submitted to the [UN] Security Council on October 8, 1997…the [International Atomic Energy] agency declared that a ‘technically coherent picture’ of Iraq’s past nuclear program had evolved, and that it saw no significant discrepancies between that picture and Iraq’s latest declaration. However, the agency added, ‘some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide […]

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10/8/1997

On October 8, 1997, “the State Department released its first list of officially designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and it did not include al Qaeda on that list…”  – Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, Page 622 […]

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9/15/1997

“The spread of Islamic radicals inside the [Saudi Arabian] military only encouraged [King Fahd’s youngest son] Azouzi to give more to radical causes. In September 1997 he coordinated a $100 million aid package to the Taliban. It didn’t make the slightest bit of difference that the Taliban were protecting bin Laden, a man who had […]

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9/7/1997

“In September [7] 1997, former Russian national security advisor Alexander Lebed revealed that many suitcase nukes were lost following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In an interview on 60 Minutes, Lebed said: ‘I’m saying that more than a hundred weapons out of the supposed number of 250 are not under the control of the […]

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8/15/1997

“In August 1997, the CIA identified a bin Laden cell entrenched in Nairobi [Kenya] run by one Wadih el Hage, a Lebanese-born naturalized American citizen who had once served as bin Laden’s personal secretary. The CIA, and even visiting FBI teams, scoured el Hage’s Nairobi home in search of evidence. But the cells in Kenya […]

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8/15/1997

“The FBI had in hand at least two intelligence warnings…about terrorist attacks in Africa. …One…in August 1997–a year before the embassy bombings. …the FBI discovered a letter…planning the bombings that would be carried out a year later. Incredibly, this invaluable intelligence was never put to use. The failure cost hundreds of lives.” [The 15th of […]

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8/7/1997

“The August 7, 1998, bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania–bin Laden called them the ‘two mighty smashes’–were the first major effort to lure Washington into sending forces to Afghanistan. A year earlier [on August 7, 1997] bin Laden had begun the campaign by ridiculing U.S. attempts to capture him, saying that the Americans […]

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8/1/1997

According to a highly redacted CIA intelligence report from August 1, 1997, there was a “plan to establish an Iraqi element in Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army [al Qaeda], which would be anti-(Saddam) Husayn. [Redacted] Sudanese National Islamic Front (NIF), however, learned of this and requested that Bin Ladin refrain from establishing such a group, because […]

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7/31/1997

“In July [31] 1997, Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer was arrested by New York City police, foiling his plan to bomb the subway system. …He had been apprehended on three separate occasions by the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] within little more than a year prior to his arrest, each time for illegally entering the country […]

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7/31/1997

On July 31, 1997, “When the FBI and NYPD raided the Park Slope, Brooklyn, apartment of two Islamic radicals accused of attempting to bomb New York’s subways [Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil], they recovered a note that not only took credit for the downing of TWA Flight 800, but also demanded the release […]

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