9/22/1998

A heavily redacted CIA intelligence report on September 22, 1998, focused on the incorporation of al-Jihad (aka Egyptian Islamic Jihad, EIJ) into al-Qa’ida. This merging was due to EIJ’s “[Redacted] shortage of funds. [EIJ leader Ayman al-] Zawahiri [redacted] rely increasingly on financial assistance from Usama (Bin Ladin), which has resulted, for practical purposes, in […]

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9/19/1998

A National Security Council email from counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, dated September 19, 1998, said, “The United States issued a formal warning to the Taliban, and also to Sudan, that they would be held directly responsible for any attacks on Americans, wherever they occurred, carried out by the Bin […]

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9/18/1998

“The CIA managed to thwart the Al Qaeda bombing of the US embassy in Kampala, Uganda, on September 18, 1998 and twenty suspects were arrested.”  – Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda, Page 159 […]

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9/16/1998

In a hearing before the House National Security Committee on September 16, 1998, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz said it was “a mistake to leave Saddam Hussein in power in 1991 and that ‘the best opportunity to deal with Saddam Hussein was in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. victory [in Operation […]

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9/15/1998

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet issued a top secret report on March 19, 2004. Regarding the search for Usama Bin Ladin (UBL), it read: “September 1998–Afghan tribal assets initiated a search and rendition operation in their area of influence. Efforts by this group continued until 11 Sep 2001 without significant results. On 9 Aug […]

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9/15/1998

“Under immense pressure from the US to put bin Laden out of commission, Prince Turki [al Faisal] of Saudi intelligence flew to Kandahar [Afghanistan] in September 1998. …The Saudi delegation asked [Taliban leader] Mullah [Mohammad] Omar to cede bin Laden to the US because he was a terrorist. Mullah Omar was enraged by this request, […]

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9/15/1998

From an interview with Saudi dissident Saad al-Fagih in September 1998: “The profound impact of [Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman] al-Zawahiri on bin Laden’s thinking has become increasingly clear, and some have suggested that this little-known physician is more important to al-Qaeda than bin Laden himself.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting […]

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9/15/1998

“Bin Laden told a Pakistani journalist [Hamid Mir, in September 1998]: ‘My father was very keen that one of his sons should fight against the enemies of Islam. So I am the one son who is acting according to the wishes of his father.’ ” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes […]

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9/15/1998

“In September 1998, the intelligence community obtained information that bin Laden’s next operation might involve flying an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and detonating it.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Peter Lance, Triple Cross, Page 191 […]

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9/15/1998

“A classified September 1998 threat report warned that in bin Laden’s next strike his operatives might fly an explosive-laden airplane into an American airport and blow it up. Another report that fall, unavailable to the public, highlighted a plot involving aircraft in New York and Washington. …Some of these threats against aviation targets were included […]

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