12/21/1998

A declassified email sent to CIA Islamabad station chief Gary Schroen from the head of the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit Michael Scheuer was dated December 21, 1998. It was a response to Schroen’s email the day before, which reflected on the fact that strikes against Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) were not carried out. It read: […]

Read More… from 12/21/1998

12/21/1998

“According to an American intelligence source, at the meeting on 21 December 1998, [Farouk] Hijazi, who was formerly director of external operations for Iraqi intelligence, ‘first offered bin Laden asylum in Iraq, and then put forward a list of targets’ bin Laden might consider attacking, including Radio Free Europe, based in Prague [Czech Republic], which […]

Read More… from 12/21/1998

12/21/1998

“Intelligence sources tell TIME [on December 21, 1998] they have evidence that bin Laden may be planning his boldest move yet–a strike on Washington or possibly New York City in an eye-for-an-eye retaliation. ‘We’ve hit his headquarters, now he hits ours,’ says a State Department aide.”  – Douglas Waller, “Inside The Hunt For Osama,” Time, […]

Read More… from 12/21/1998

12/20/1998

A declassified email to the head of the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit Michael Scheuer, sent from CIA Islamabad station chief Gary Schroen, dated December 20, 1998, reflected on the fact that strikes against Bin Ladin were not carried out. It read: “DCI [Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet] wanted my views–I said hit him [Bin […]

Read More… from 12/20/1998

12/20/1998

Regarding the legality of assassinating Osama bin Laden: “Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA Bin Laden unit, claims the intelligence was sometimes good enough to fire. ‘The Sunday before Christmas in [December 20] 1998, Bin Laden was staying overnight in the governor’s palace in Kandahar [Afghanistan]. We knew he was there because we saw him […]

Read More… from 12/20/1998

12/20/1998

According to information in a New York Times article on December 20, 1998, “Among the items that Iraq admitted to possessing, but which weapons inspectors could never locate, were: 3.9 tons of nerve gas, 600 tons of nerve gas ingredients, 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas, 157 germ bombs, 25 missile warheads filled with […]

Read More… from 12/20/1998

12/20/1998

“Iraq has refused to admit inspectors since 1998, when the Clinton administration and British forces responded with four nights of air and missile strikes against more than 100 targets, including military headquarters and air defenses [which ended December 20, 1998].”  – Elisabeth Bumiller, “Readmit Inspectors, President Tells Iraq; ‘Or Else’ is Unstated,” The New York […]

Read More… from 12/20/1998

12/20/1998

“On December 20 [1998], intelligence indicated Bin Ladin would be spending the night at the Haji Habash house, part of the governor’s residence in Kandahar [Afghanistan].” As a response, the Bin Ladin unit of the CIA held “an urgent teleconference of principals.” Though a cruise missile strike was considered, the accuracy of the initial report […]

Read More… from 12/20/1998

12/19/1998

During Operation Desert Fox, “On December 19 [1998], Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan declared that UNSCOM’s [UN Special Commission on Iraq’s] [weapons inspection] mission was over.”  – Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, Page 35 […]

Read More… from 12/19/1998

12/19/1998

In an interview with Al Jazeera on April 8, 2008, Iraqi ambassador Mohammed al-Douri said: ” ‘During [Operation] Desert Fox [the December 16-19, 1998 strikes on Iraq for failing to comply with UN resolutions] the US military fired some 400 missiles at Iraqi civilians.’ ”  – Ahmed Janabi, “Interview: Mohammed al-Douri,” Al Jazeera, April 8, […]

Read More… from 12/19/1998