8/8/1999

According to information in a Los Angeles Times article from August 8, 1999, “The Taliban and bin Laden have not enjoyed perfect relations. While he was their guest and they were not eager to hand him over to the United States, he had also been a headache for the movement’s leadership, who did not appreciate […]

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8/6/1999

“…on 6 August 1999, CBS reported, ‘U.S. intelligence sources say they have made a fundamental shift in their assessment of terrorist leader Osama bin Laden. Once confident that bin Laden only had enough resources to strike targets overseas, like the East Africa embassies that are still under repair, they now believe he has the money […]

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8/4/1999

“According to the American intelligence analyst, a field source in Pakistan had passed word through a Pakistani military officer that bin Laden was in the northwest town of Peshawar. The warning was given on August 4, 1999. For reasons still unclear, U.S. intelligence only received notification on August 7, by which time bin Laden was […]

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8/4/1999

“In early August [4] 1999, the FAA’s [Federal Aviation Administration’s] Civil Aviation Security intelligence office summarized the Bin Ladin hijacking threat. After a solid recitation of all the information available on this topic, the paper identified a few principal scenarios, one of which was a ‘suicide hijacking operation.’ The FAA analysts judged such an operation […]

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8/3/1999

The CIA released a top secret report on Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) on August 3, 1999. Regarding the threat assessment, it read: “-A UBL attack against US interests could occur at any time or any place. -It is unlikely that the CIA will have prior warning about the time or place of a UBL attack. […]

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7/15/1999

In July 1999, “Taleban security arrested four men wearing Taleban security uniforms as they tried to drive a jeep through a checkpoint into Kandahar city [Afghanistan]. The Taleban found explosives and weapons in the vehicle, and said the would-be assassins were Tajiks who confessed to being members of [Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah] Massoud’s forces […]

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7/15/1999

“…U.S. sanctions took effect in July 1999, freezing Taliban financial assets and blocking travel to the United States; international sanctions would follow in October.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, Page 161 […]

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7/15/1999

“According to Khalil Ibrahim Abdallah, a former assistant for operations in the Iraqi Intelligence Service captured by coalition forces in April 2003, bin Laden requested a meeting with Saddam in July 1999. A summary of Abdallah’s debriefing reads: ‘The guidance sent back from Saddam’s office reportedly ordered Iraqi intelligence to refrain from any further contact […]

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7/15/1999

In July 1999, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control “had the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Ladin or Al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system…It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, […]

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7/9/1999

President Bill Clinton spoke with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in June 1999, with the intentions of getting Pakistan to pressure the Taliban to stop sheltering Bin Ladin. Sharif suggested “that Pakistani forces might try to capture Bin Ladin themselves. Though no one in Washington thought this was likely to happen, President Clinton gave the […]

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