“…there are clear signs that Iran helped al Qaeda, including providing lodging for two key al Qaeda operatives at the Iranian Embassy in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia, during a January 2000 meeting of al Qaeda terrorists there.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – Bill Gertz, Breakdown, Page 165 […]
1/15/2000
“The agency’s [CIA’s] ‘lapse’ in [future 9/11 hijacker Khalid] al-Mihdhar’s case, [CIA Director George] Tenet said later [in his testimony to the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002], ‘was caused by a combination of inadequate training of some of our officers, their intense focus on achieving the objectives of the operation itself, determining whether […]
1/15/2000
“The sole purpose for setting up [the CIA’s] Alec Station was to keep track of bin Laden and members of Al Qaeda–and most important, to keep them out of the United States. Yet after NSA [National Security Agency] managed to pick up the first clue, and after a successful worldwide operation that tracked [future 9/11 […]
1/15/2000
“Of all the 9/11 hijackers, these two Saudis [Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi] had the longest records of al Qaeda involvement, and beginning in January 2000, they soon became the most visible of the nineteen operatives. In fact, these two failed pilots appeared on the radar of the NSA [National Security Agency], the CIA, and […]
1/15/2000
“In early March 2000, [CIA intelligence in] Bangkok [Thailand] reported that [future 9/11 hijacker] Nawaf al Hazmi…had departed [from Bangkok] on January 15 [2000] on a United Airlines flight to Los Angeles. As for [fellow hijacker] Khalid al Mihdhar, there was no report of his departure even though he had accompanied Hazmi on the United […]
1/15/2000
The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was “set up from January 2000 in a way that excluded spies by ensuring that all the staff were employed by the UN and paid by a charge made on the Oil for Food programme, which was funded by Iraqi oil. Iraq had an interest in […]
1/15/2000
“…the CIA learned that [future 9/11 hijacker Nawaf al-] Hazmi had flown to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Had it checked the flight manifest, it would have noticed that [fellow hijacker] Khaled al-Mihdhar was traveling with him. The agency neglected to inform either the FBI or the State Department that at least one well-known […]
1/12/2000
“On January 12, 2000, the chief of the CIA’s al Qaeda unit briefed his bosses about the Kuala Lumpur [Malaysia] [terrorist summit] meeting. The official, apparently unaware that the meeting had broken up four days earlier, reported erroneously that the surveillance in Kuala Lumpur was continuing. Three days later, unbeknownst to U.S. officials, [future 9/11 […]
1/11/2000
Fearing upcoming attacks, counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke wrote to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger on January 11, 2000, saying: “The CIA, the FBI, Justice and the NSC [National Security Council] staff had come to two main conclusions. First, the U.S. disruption efforts thus far had ‘not put too much of a dent’ in Bin Ladin’s […]
1/8/2000
Following the summit of al Qaeda plotters in Malaysia, future 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, along with African embassy bombing planner Khallad bin Atash, flew to Bangkok, Thailand, on January 8, 2000. All three had been tracked by members of the intelligence agencies. “And yet following the January 8 flight, both the FBI […]