“In October 2000, the president [Bill Clinton] chose not to identify bin Laden as the originator of the attack on the USS Cole, even though his own intelligence apparatus said there was no other conclusion.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, Page […]
10/15/2000
“The armed Predator [drone] flew over Afghanistan eleven times in September and October 2000, [counterterrorism czar Richard] Clarke told the author [Richard Miniter]. It supplied hours of clear video, showing bin Laden in various compounds. In October 2000, the Predator crashed in Afghanistan. Whether it was brought down by high winds or machine gunfire, no […]
10/15/2000
In October 2000, “the National Commission on Terrorism, led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, reached a conclusion that was all too clear: ‘The U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities lacked the ability to prioritize, translate and understand in a timely fashion, all of the information to which they have access.” [The 15th of the month […]
10/15/2000
The Military Policy staff of the 9/11 Commission concluded on March 23, 2004, that actionable intelligence was lacking in order for President Bill Clinton to respond militarily to the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000: “The problem was in assigning responsibility for the attack. The intelligence community immediately suspected al Qaeda, but they […]
10/13/2000
“A Pentagon intelligence analyst [Kie Fallis] resigned on October 13 [2000], declaring that his warnings about al Qaeda in the region had been ignored and suppressed by his superiors. None of his analysis involved specific threats against the [USS] Cole, however. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, the former White House counterterrorism aides in [counterterrorism czar] […]
10/12/2000
“After al-Qaeda bombed the USS Cole in Aden’s harbor [Yemen] on October 12, 2000, bin Laden told [journalist] Ahmad Zaydon, ‘I knelt to thank God for this heroic operation that damaged the prestige of the United States and served as a warning for them to leave the Arab world and the [Arabian] peninsula according to […]
10/12/2000
“A Navy inquiry into preparations aboard the [USS Cole] destroyer [which was attacked on October 12, 2000] determined that the commander had failed to apply the most basic security procedures. No one was on the bridge, and those on watch had not been briefed on their responsibilities. According to Vice Admiral C.W. Moore, Jr., commander […]
10/12/2000
On October 12, 2000, “the same day that the attack on the [USS] Cole occurred, NSA [National Security Agency] issued an intelligence report based on intercepts (most likely calls coming in and out of [al Qaeda operative] Ahmed al-Hada’s home in Sana’a [Yemen]) warning that terrorists were planning an attack in the region. However, the […]
10/12/2000
” ‘We’ve got to change the rules,’ the CIA’s [unidentified] bin Laden unit chief argued in the aftermath [of the USS Cole bombing on October 12, 2000]. It was time for the agency to try to break the policy stalemate about the Taliban. Al Qaeda was growing, and its sanctuary in Afghanistan allowed ever more […]
10/12/2000
” ‘We had data just days before the [October 12, 2000] [USS] Cole bombing,’ says Lt. Col. [Anthony] Shaffer, ‘that Aden [Yemen] was a hot spot. I communicated this information to SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] and they reportedly passed it on to CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], but for unknown reasons the threat assessment was […]