According to a top secret report from Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet on March 19, 2004: “Another SEIB [Senior Executive Intelligence Brief] article, on July 25 [2001] noted that, although one Bin Ladin attack had been delayed for a few months, preparations for other, near-term attacks were still underway.” – CIA, “DCI Report: The […]
7/25/2001
According to a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief titled, ‘Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing [Excised]’ on July 25, 2001: “[Redacted] indicates that an Usama Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operation has been postponed. [Redacted] still planned but had been delayed a few months. [Redacted] results would still be forthcoming [redacted]. Preparations for other attacks remain […]
7/25/2001
9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, “concerned that [hijacker Ziad] Jarrah might be backing out of the operation, instructed [co-conspirator Ramzi] bin al Shib to wire money to [suspected terrorist] Zacarias Moussaoui. Moussaoui had been taking flying lessons in Norman, Oklahoma, beginning in February [2001], but had stopped in May. Bin al Shib wired money to […]
7/25/2001
According to former CIA Director George Tenet, in late July 2001, “as we speculated about the kind of attacks we could face, Rich B. [a covert CIA operative] suddenly said, with complete conviction, ‘They’re coming here.’ I’ll never forget the silence that followed.” [The 25th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – […]
7/25/2001
CIA Director George Tenet told the 9/11 Commission that by late July 2001, “the threat level could not ‘get any worse’–‘the system was blinking red.’ …The collection efforts of the CIA and other organizations were not only bombarded with signs and reports of threatening activity, but the warning system itself–all those channels of communication intended […]
7/24/2001
Former CIA Director George Tenet wrote, “In a briefing I received on July 24 [2001], I learned that Jordan’s King Abdullah had sent word that, in his view, Bin Ladin and his command structure in Afghanistan must be dealt with in a decisive and military fashion. To that end, he offered to send two battalions […]
7/23/2001
“The most startling finding in this report [Staff Statement #1 of the 9/11 Commission, on January 26, 2004] is that [9/11 mastermind] Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was indicted in 1996, got a legal visa to enter the United States on July 23, 2001, about six weeks prior to 9/11. ‘Although he is not a Saudi […]
7/20/2001
On July 20, 2001, “as the G-8 leaders met in Genoa [Italy]… Egyptian intelligence warned the CIA of a potential suicide attack, in which hijackers might try to crash a plane into one of the host buildings at the summit. Believing the threat credible, the Agency reportedly asked the Italian military to ring the summit […]
7/19/2001
“On July 19 [2001], on a periodic conference call with the FBI’s field offices, Acting Director Thomas Pickard mentioned that, in light of the increased threat reporting, the Bureau needed to have ‘evidence response teams ready’ in case of an attack. ‘He did not ask field offices to try to determine whether any plots were […]
7/19/2001
“On July 19 [2001], Attorney General John Ashcroft left on a trip to his home state of Missouri aboard a private jet. When asked by reporters why he didn’t use a commercial airliner, as was customary, the Justice Department cited what it called a ‘threat assessment’ by the FBI. The attorney general, they said, had […]