8/6/2001

During National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice’s hearing in before the 9/11 commission on April 8, 2004, “There was an audible gasp in the audience as Rice confirmed officially, once and for all, what had long been suspected–that the August 6 [2001] PDB [Presidential Daily Briefing] was an explicit warning from the CIA, only a month […]

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8/6/2001

From the August 6, 2001, President’s Daily Brief: ” ‘Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Laden implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and […]

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8/6/2001

“[C]oncerned about a U.S. strike, President Bush asked the CIA to prepare a report on the domestic threat posed by al Qaeda. On August 6 [2001], the agency briefed him at his ranch in Crawford, Texas.” The report “said that bin Laden’s organization had plans to hijack a plane and use the hostages to spring […]

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8/6/2001

The intelligence community’s “gale-force wind of warning [of an impending terrorist attack] reached its highest level on August 6 [2001], when the PDB [President’s Daily Briefing] delivered to President Bush on vacation in Texas was headlined ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.‘ ”  – Thomas Powers, The Military Error, Page 32 […]

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8/5/2001

“Officials…said the CIA had developed general information a month before the attacks that heightened concerns that bin Laden and his followers were increasingly determined to strike on U.S. soil after several strikes overseas. The information indicated bin Laden and his supporters ‘were trying to bring the fight to America’ but details were lacking, a U.S. […]

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8/4/2001

“On August 4 [2001], [lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed] Atta drove to the Orlando airport to pick up a final hijacker, Mohamed al Khatani. Khatani was detained by INS [Immigration and Naturalization Services] officials, however, because he spoke no English, was traveling with a one-way ticket and little money, and could not explain what he planned […]

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8/4/2001

Alleged 20th hijacker Mohamed al-Kahtani arrived in the U.S. at Orlando International Airport on August 4, 2001. “As he attempted to go through immigration, inspector Jose Melendez-Perez grew suspicious. Al-Kahtani had no return ticket, limited funds, no hotel reservations, and he refused to identify the ‘friend’ he said was waiting for him. That friend, videotape […]

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8/4/2001

“FBI ‘clean teams,’ which gather evidence without using information gained during controversial interrogations, have established that [Mohammed] Qahtani intended to join the [September 11] 2001 hijackers. Mohammed Atta, the plot’s leader…went to the airport in Orlando, Fla., to meet Qahtani on Aug. 4, 2001, but the young Saudi was denied entry by a suspicious immigration […]

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8/3/2001

“On August 3 [2001], the intelligence community issued an advisory concluding that the threat of impending al Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefinitely. Citing threats in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, the advisory suggested that al Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in security before moving forward with the planned […]

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8/2/2001

9/11 hijackers Hani Hanjour and Khalid al-Mihdhar obtained papers as official residents of Virginia on August 1, 2001. “The next day [August 2, 2001], Hanjour and al-Mihdhar made use of their new identity papers to become sponsors of ‘logistics men’ Majed Moqed and [Salim] Alhamzi. The other hijackers procured new identification papers the same way. […]

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