8/15/2001

“In August [15] of 2001, FBI headquarters denied its Minneapolis field office permission to search the laptop computer of Zacarias Moussaoui, an Al Qaeda operative training for a second wave of attacks.”  – Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, Page 17 […]

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8/15/2001

” ‘We are going to be struck soon,’ [CIA Counterterrorist Center Director] Cofer Black told the Pentagon’s classified annual conference on counterterrorism [on August 15, 2001] nine days later [than the August 6, 2001, Presidential Daily Briefing]. ‘Many Americans are going to die, and it could be in the U.S.”  – Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, […]

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8/15/2001

“In August 2001, the intelligence community obtained information about a plot to bomb a U.S. embassy in Nairobi [Kenya] from an airplane or crash the airplane into it. The intelligence community learned that two people who were reportedly acting on instructions from bin Laden met in October 2000 to discuss this plot.” [The 15th of […]

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8/15/2001

“Three weeks before the [9/11] attack [in August 2001]…a French-Algerian named Habib Zacarias Moussaoui booked hours on a flight simulator at an aviation school in Minneapolis. He wanted to learn, in a hurry, how to fly a jet–landing procedures didn’t matter–and he paid for everything in cash. The flight instructor became suspicious and informed the […]

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8/15/2001

” ‘You’re basically asking for the overthrow of the Taliban,’ an incredulous midlevel State Department officer told [future Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s brother] Qayum Karzai in one meeting that August [2001]. ‘I’m not sure if our government is prepared to do that.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – […]

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8/15/2001

From the 9/11 Commission Report’s list of Operational Opportunities: “August 2001: the CIA and FBI do not connect the presence of [future 9/11 hijackers Khalid al] Mihdhar, [Nawaf al] Hamzi, and [suspected terrorist Zacarias] Moussaoui to the general threat reporting about imminent attacks.” [The 15th of the month is used for date sorting purposes only.] […]

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8/15/2001

From the 9/11 Commission Report’s list of Operational Opportunities: “August 2001: the CIA does not focus on information that [9/11 mastermind] Khalid Sheikh Mohammed [KSM] is a key al Qaeda lieutenant or connect information identifying KSM as the ‘Mukhtar’ mentioned in other reports to the analysis that could have linked ‘Mukhtar’ with [9/11 conspirator] Ramzi […]

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8/15/2001

From the 9/11 Commission Report’s list of Operational Opportunities: “August 2001: FBI headquarters does not recognize the significance of the information regarding [suspected terrorist Zacarias] Moussaoui’s training and beliefs and thus does not take adequate action to share information, involve higher-level officials across agencies, obtain information regarding Moussaoui’s ties to al Qaeda, and give sufficient […]

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8/15/2001

In former CIA Director George Tenet’s memoir At the Center of the Storm, he wrote: ” ‘a few weeks after the Aug. 6 [2001] PDB [President’s Daily Briefing] was delivered, I followed it to Crawford [Texas] to make sure the president [Bush] stayed current on events.’ …If [9/11 Commission member Tim] Roemer’s suspicions were right, […]

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8/15/2001

On August 15, 2001, “a flight school in Minnesota contacted the local FBI field office to express concern about a student, Zacarias Moussaoui. He had asked suspicious questions about the flight patterns around New York City and whether the doors of a cockpit could be opened during flight. The local bureau quickly determined that Moussaoui […]

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