9/5/2001

Then-CIA Director George Tenet wrote: “By early September [2001], CIA had a group of assets from a Middle Eastern service working on our behalf. None of the more than twenty individuals knew they were working for us. They were targeted against a range of terrorism issues. One third of them worked against al-Qa’ida. By September […]

Read More… from 9/5/2001

9/5/2001

“Intelligence agents based in Iraq claimed that Saddam himself had retreated to one of his heavily fortified bunkers in the family fiefdom of Tikrit, in northern Iraq. …The clear implication was that Saddam had retreated to Tikrit in early September 2001 because he had prior warning of the September 11 attacks…” [The 5th of the […]

Read More… from 9/5/2001

9/4/2001

Then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice wrote: “Ironically, the al Qaeda [counterterrorism] strategy was finally ready for the Principals’ review on September 4 [2001]. The meeting was fruitful. We were able to agree on a strategy of implementing an ambitious covert-action program in Afghanistan and launching the Predator drone for reconnaissance missions. Because its armed capabilities […]

Read More… from 9/4/2001

9/4/2001

On September 4, 2001, “the FBI finally informed the Federal Aviation Administration’s [FAA’s] liaison to the Bureau, Jack Salata, about [potential terrorist Zacarias] Moussaoui’s detention. The Bureau told him that Moussaoui might have intended to hijack a plane, but that there was no evidence he was part of a larger plot. Since he was already […]

Read More… from 9/4/2001

9/4/2001

Counterterrorism czar Richard “Clarke sent an agonized note that morning [September 4, 2001] to Condoleezza Rice, begging the national security adviser to envision hundreds of Americans lying dead from the next attack. He said the agency [CIA] had become ‘a hollow shell of words without deeds,’ relying on foreign governments to stop bin Laden, leaving […]

Read More… from 9/4/2001

9/4/2001

“During July [2001], the [National Security Council] deputies’ committee recommended a comprehensive plan, not just to roll back al Qaeda but to eliminate it. It was a plan to go on the offensive and destabilize the Taliban. …It was not until September 4 [2001] that they approved and recommended a plan that would give the […]

Read More… from 9/4/2001

9/4/2001

“The Bush Cabinet met at the White House on September 4 [2001]. Before them was a draft copy of a National Security Presidential Directive, a classified memo outlining a new U.S. policy toward al Qaeda and Afghanistan. The stated goal of the draft document was to eliminate bin Laden and his organization. Its provisions included […]

Read More… from 9/4/2001

9/4/2001

Counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke presented his plan against Al Qaeda on September 4, 2001, in a Principal’s meeting with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, CIA director George Tenet, Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. “If the group […]

Read More… from 9/4/2001

9/4/2001

“On September 4 [2001], [counterterrorism czar Richard] Clarke was finally given the chance to present his strategy [for attacking al Qaeda] at a meeting of the administration’s so-called Principals Committee, a group of high-level cabinet-ranking policy makers. …it was only their second meeting about terrorism [in seven and half months]–out of 90 to 100 meetings […]

Read More… from 9/4/2001

9/4/2001

On September 4, 2001, counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke wrote National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice a memo “in which Clarke seemed to predict what was just about to happen. It was a memo that seemed to spill out all of Clarke’s frustration about how slowly the Bush White House had responded to a cascade of terrorist […]

Read More… from 9/4/2001