9/11/2001

“A central element of the NORAD cover story was that air force jet fighters had heroically chased United 93 [on September 11, 2001]. Had it not crashed in Pennsylvania because of the struggle between the hijackers and passengers, the United plane would have been blown out of the sky before it reached its target in […]

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9/11/2001

The 9/11 Commission report from June 17, 2004 detailed America’s air defense: “The U.S. military–the last line of defense [on September 11, 2001] against the hijacked aircraft–had nine minutes’ notice that American Airlines Flight 11 had been hijacked, two minutes’ notice that an unidentified aircraft, American 77, was headed toward Washington, and no notice at […]

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9/11/2001

“The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with pre-existing training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction.”  – 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission […]

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9/11/2001

Regarding reactions following the hijackings on September 11, 2001, “The 9/11 Commission’s report adds, ‘In sum, the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear; there would be time to […]

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9/11/2001

On January 27, 2004, the 9/11 Commission “heard a tape recording of the last known words of Betty Ong, a flight attendant for American Airlines Flight 11, the plane that crashed in to the North Tower of the World Trade Center [on September 11, 2001]. Ong had used an on-board phone to call airline supervisors […]

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9/11/2001

Regarding reactions following the hijackings on September 11, 2001, “even if the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] had decided within the first minutes of Flight 11’s erratic behavior and loss of communication that a hijacking had taken place and alerted the military, NORAD’s rules of engagement did not permit fighter pilots to shoot down commercial aircraft. […]

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9/11/2001

On September 11, 2001, “The terrorists thwarted the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] by turning off the transponders and not responding to radio transmissions. As for NORAD’s more sophisticated radar, it ringed the continent, looking outward for threats, not inward. ‘When you looked at NORAD on September 11, we had a ring of radar all around […]

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9/11/2001

According to the report from the 9/11 Commission hearing on June 17, 2004: “one of the frustrations expressed to us by President Bush in our interview with him was that he could not remain in contact with people because [on September 11, 2001] the phones on Air Force One were cutting in and out.”  – […]

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9/11/2001

According to a Washington Post article on March 1, 2002, on September 11, 2001, Vice President Dick “Cheney became in effect the leader of a U.S. ‘shadow government.’: President Bush had dispatched a shadow government of about 100 senior civilian managers to live and work secretly outside Washington, activating for the first time long-standing plans […]

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9/11/2001

“Disturbingly, the story [President] George W. Bush often tells of his learning of the [9/11] attacks cannot possibly be true. ‘I was sitting outside of the classroom [on September 11, 2001], waiting to go in,’ he told an audience in Florida on December 4, 2001, ‘and I saw an airplane hit the tower–the TV was […]

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