9/11/2001

On September 11, 2001, the CAPPS (Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) had “only twenty names of potential terrorists in the computer database–none belonging to any of the nineteen hijackers.”  – James Bamford, The Shadow Factory, Page 83 […]

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9/11/2001

As the hijackers checked in at Dulles International Airport on the morning of September 11, 2001, “Both [Khalid al-] Mihdhar and [Majed] Moqed were flagged by CAPPS [Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System], but since Mihdhar had no checked luggage and Moqed wasn’t carrying any explosives, the procedures had no effect on their mission.”  – James Bamford, […]

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9/11/2001

As the hijackers checked in at Dulles International Airport (Washington, D.C.) on the morning of September 11, 2001, Hani Hanjour was “flagged by CAPPS [Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System], and the Hazmi brothers [Nawaf and Salem] were flagged by the American Airlines ticket agent because one of them had no photo identification and could not understand […]

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9/11/2001

“Within fifteen minutes of the attacks [on September 11, 2001], the National Security Agency [NSA] intercepted a call from an Al Qaeda operative in Asia to a contact in a former Soviet republic reporting the ‘good news’ of the attacks in New York and on the Pentagon. [CIA Director George] Tenet passed that report on […]

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9/11/2001

According to John Farmer, Senior Counsel to the 9/11 Commission, on September 11, 2001, “The FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] had an institutional exposure in its handling of United 93 that it did not have with respect to its handling of United 175. Its failure for nearly 30 minutes, and after the attacks had been under […]

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9/11/2001

On September 11, 2001, “In the White House bunker, reports began coming in at 10:02 about an inbound aircraft, presumably hijacked. The reports were coming from the Secret Service, which was talking to someone at FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] Headquarters. Unbeknownst to the Secret Service and the White House, FAA Headquarters may have been following […]

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9/11/2001

“At 9:44 [on September 11, 2001], NORAD reported to the Air Threat Conference Call [held by the Pentagon] that Delta 1989 might be a hijacked plane based on the information NEADS [NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector] had received from the FAA’s [Federal Aviation Administration’s] Boston Center. Four minutes later, a caller from the White House […]

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9/11/2001

On September 11, 2001, “At 9:29, President Bush addressed the nation from the Booker Elementary School in Sarasota [Florida]. He said: ‘Ladies and gentlemen, this is a difficult moment for America. …Today we’ve had a national tragedy. Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our country. I […]

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9/11/2001

On September 11, 2001, “At 9:24 a.m., [the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s)] Great Lakes Regional Operations Center notified FAA Headquarters of the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification for American 77 [the third hijack of the day]. No one from headquarters contacted the military with this information.”  – John Farmer, The Ground Truth, […]

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9/11/2001

Just after 9 a.m. on September 11, 2001, “a manager from the [Federal Aviation Administration’s] New York Center, on the phone with the [Air Traffic Control] Command Center in Hernon [Virginia], stated: ‘We have several situations going on here. It’s escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us. …We’re…involved with […]

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