9/13/2001

“After [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz mentioned in a September 13 [2001] Pentagon press briefing that the [Bush] administration would make ‘ending states who sponsor terrorism’ a priority, [Secretary of State Colin] Powell publicly dissociated himself from this approach, saying, ‘Ending terrorism is where I would like to leave it…and let Mr. Wolfowitz speak […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001

9/13/2001

“Late tonight [September 13, 2001], the Senate approved an amendment as part of a spending bill to finance the Justice Department that would make it easier for law enforcement to wiretap computers and combat cyberterrorism.”  – Lizette Alvarez, “Spying on Terrorists and Thwarting Them Gains New Urgency,” The New York Times, Sep. 14, 2001 […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001

9/13/2001

On September 13, 2001, “After hearing the CIA’s presentation [which called for attacking the Taliban and Al Qaeda] the President [Bush] asked [Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer] Black simply, ‘How long will it take?’ To the surprise of others present at the meeting, including [CIA Director George] Tenet, Black told the President that he thought the […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001

9/13/2001

During lunch on September 13, 2001, a former top British intelligence officer said to CIA Chief of Clandestine Operations in Europe, Tyler Drumheller: ” ‘You need to learn from our history,’ …’We decided to turn the terrorists’ tactics back on them. For a time, it worked. It stopped the immediate attacks. But watch out,’ he […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001

9/13/2001

“On September 13 [2001], two days after the attacks, [Saudi Ambassador Prince] Bandar met again with the president [Bush] at the White House. The president told Bandar, ‘If we get somebody and we can’t get them to cooperate, we hand them over to you.’ With those words, the president casually expressed what became the U.S. […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001

9/13/2001

After a meeting with President Bush and his National Security Council on September 13, 2001, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith said: “As I left this meeting, I was struck by several points. Two days after the attacks, I noticed, [CIA director] George Tenet seemed already to have concluded that Usama bin Laden and […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001

9/13/2001

In a National Security Council meeting with President Bush on September 13, 2001: “Looking beyond bin Laden and Afghanistan, [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld mentioned Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a threat to both its region and to the United States. Iraq, he observed, was a state that supported terrorism, and that might someday offer terrorists […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001

9/13/2001

Former CIA Director George Tenet described the terrorism response needed in Afghanistan: ” ‘We need to go in fast, hard, and light,’ we told the president [Bush]. ‘Everyone, including al-Qa’ida and the Taliban are expecting us to invade Afghanistan the same way the Soviets did in the 1980s.’ …Ours was a strategy unlike any other […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001

9/13/2001

Then-CIA Director George Tenet wrote:  “Within hours of [Deputy Secretary of State Richard] Armitage’s delivering his ultimatums [at a meeting with Pakistani officials on September 13, 2001], and despite some violent internal opposition, [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf agreed to them. In this period, Pakistan had done a complete about-face and become one of our most […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001

9/13/2001

Then-CIA Director George Tenet wrote: “On September 13 [2001], [Deputy Secretary of State] Rich Armitage invited Pakistani ambassador Maleeha Lodhi and Mahmood Ahmed, the Pakistan intelligence chief…over to the State Department and dropped the hammer on them. …Pakistan was either with us or against us. Specifically, Armitage demanded that Pakistan begin stopping al-Qa’ida agents at […]

Read More… from 9/13/2001