At a September 14, 2001, press briefing of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), panelist Laurie Mylroie said: ” ‘how likely is it that Osama bin Laden’s group or any other group carried out these [9/11] attacks alone, unassisted by a state? I’d like to suggest that it is extremely unlikely–in fact, next to impossible.’ Who, […]
9/14/2001
“The Saudi embassy contacted the FBI about possibly evacuating some Saudi nationals, fearing reprisal attacks; the FBI prescreened the Saudi nationals, including the members of the Bin Ladin family before permitting them to leave, and many were interviewed; [counterterrorism czar] Richard Clarke approved the departure of the planes only after he had been told that […]
9/14/2001
On September 14, 2001, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman proposed in a strategy memo for the War on Terrorism: ” ‘The immediate priority targets for initial action’ should be al Qaida, the Taliban, and Iraq. Iraq was on this list, we noted, […]
9/14/2001
In a strategy memo written to President Bush and the National Security Council on September 14, 2001, titled ‘War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept,’ Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman said: “The United States must confront ‘the entire network of states, non-state entities, and […]
9/14/2001
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith said, regarding retaliation for 9/11: “There was pressure on the President [Bush] to ‘go soon,’ he [Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld] told us [on September 14, 2001], but this created a danger that we might do ‘something hollow, ineffective, embarrassing.’ Because our first action would likely be ‘moderately […]
9/14/2001
“A [September 14, 2001] Defense Department paper for the Camp David briefing book on the strategic concept for the war on terrorism specified three priority targets for internal action: al Qaeda, the Taliban and Iraq. It argued that of the three, al Qaeda and Iraq posted a strategic threat to the United States. Iraq’s long-standing […]
9/14/2001
On September 14, 2001, the State Department “delivered to the White House a paper titled ‘Game Plan for a Political-Military Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.’ The paper took it as a given that Bin Ladin would continue to act against the United States even while under Taliban control. It therefore detailed specific U.S. demands for […]
9/14/2001
On September 14, 2001, “Effective at 12:15 p.m., FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] reauthorized agricultural flight operations (crop dusting) under Part 137. Effective at 4:00 p.m., DOT [Department of Transportation] approved reopening of the airspace to certain general aviation flights. Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations were permitted, except within two areas under Temporary Flight Restrictions that […]
9/14/2001
On September 14, 2001, President’s Bush’s lawyers sought advice from the Justice Department regarding Bush’s use of war powers inside America. “Bush’s legal team was arguing that the President not only had power to defend the nation as he saw fit…he also had the power to override existing laws that Congress had specifically designed to […]
9/14/2001
On September 14, 2001, as Congress was nearing approval for the U.S. to go to war against the 9/11 attackers, “the White House presented an urgent new proposal, ‘a draft that gave the White House virtually unchecked authority and the ability to do virtually anything,’ [Democratic Senate Majority Leader Tom] Daschle [D-SD] recalled. …President Bush […]