9/17/2001

“On September 17 [2001], [President Bush] signed the Top Secret/Pearl order for new CIA and military operations against terrorists worldwide. Afghanistan was the first priority. [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld was directed to continue working on Iraq war plans but it was not to be a top priority.”  – Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, Page […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001

9/17/2001

In a September 17, 2001, memo headlined ‘Preventing More Events,’ Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz argued (to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) “that if there was even a 10 percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum priority should be placed on eliminating that threat. Wolfowitz contended that the odds were ‘far […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001

9/17/2001

“At the September 17 [2001] NSC [National Security Council] meeting, there was some further discussion of ‘phase two’ of the war on terrorism. President Bush ordered the Defense Department to be ready to deal with Iraq if Baghdad acted against U.S. interests, with plans to include possibly occupying Iraqi oil fields.”  – 9/11 Commission, The […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001

9/17/2001

In his meeting with principals on September 17, 2001, “President Bush instructed [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld and [Joint Chiefs Chairman General Hugh] Shelton to develop further the Camp David military plan [of September 15-16] to attack the Taliban and al Qaeda if the Taliban rejected the ultimatum. The President also tasked Rumsfeld to ensure […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001

9/17/2001

In his meeting with principals on September 17, 2001, “President Bush charged [Attorney General John] Ashcroft, [FBI Director Robert] Mueller, and [Director of Central Intelligence George] Tenet to develop a plan for homeland defense. President Bush directed Secretary of State [Colin] Powell to deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban along the lines that his department […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001

9/17/2001

Then-CIA Director George Tenet wrote, after the 9/11 attacks, the CIA wanted to use their tribal sources in Afghanistan to track down those responsible. “The president [Bush] approved our recommendations on Monday, September 17 [2001], and provided us broad authorities to engage al-Qa’ida. As [Chief of CIA’s Counterterrorist Center] Cofer Black later told Congress, ‘the […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001

9/17/2001

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice presented a paper to President Bush dealing with directives for setting the retaliation for the 9/11 attacks in motion. “President Bush then considered [this paper] with principals on Monday morning, September 17 [2001]. ‘The purpose of this meeting,’ he recalled saying, ‘is to assign tasks for the first wave of […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001

9/17/2001

“The September 17 [2001] Memorandum of Notification [allowing the CIA to assassinate terrorists] had moved much faster than usual. …in this critical instance, the CIA would be gaining fearsome new powers with very little debate–none of it public. The Agency was taking on new responsibilities in areas where it had no expertise, such as interrogation […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001

9/17/2001

“The officials said that at the meeting in Kandahar [Afghanistan], where the delegation arrived this morning [September 17, 2001], the Taliban leaders would be told that they had ‘only a few days’ to hand over Mr. bin Laden or face an eventual American military attack that would almost certainly target the Taliban as well as […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001

9/17/2001

Vice President Dick “Cheney said there was no indication that Iraq was linked to last week’s [9/11] terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. ‘Saddam Hussein’s bottled up at this point,’ he said.”  – Michael R. Gordon, “A New War And Its Scale,” The New York Times, Sep. 17, 2001 […]

Read More… from 9/17/2001