On August 29, 2009, Commander of U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal delivered a confidential Initial Assessment on the situation in Afghanistan. He concluded: ” ‘Failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, […]
8/29/2009
On August 29, 2009, Commander of U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal delivered a confidential Initial Assessment on the situation in Afghanistan. It claimed “Insurgents had ‘a Taliban *shadow government* that actively seeks to control the population and displace the national government and traditional power structures.’ ” – Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, […]
8/29/2009
On August 29, 2009, Commander of U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal delivered a confidential Initial Assessment on the situation in Afghanistan. It read: ” ‘We cannot succeed simply by trying harder… The entire culture–how ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] understands the environment and defined the fight, how it interacts with the […]
8/29/2009
On August 29, 2009, Commander of U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal delivered a confidential Initial Assessment on the situation in Afghanistan. It read: ” ‘Almost every aspect of our collective effort and associated resourcing has lagged a growing insurgency–historically a recipe for failure’ in counterinsurgency. …the Afghan security force ‘will not […]
8/29/2009
On August 29, 2009, Commander of U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal delivered a confidential Initial Assessment on the situation in Afghanistan. It read: ” ‘Pre-occupied with the protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us–physically and psychologically–from the people we seek to protect.’ It baldly […]
8/29/2009
On August 29, 2009, Commander of U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal delivered a confidential Initial Assessment on the situation in Afghanistan. It read: ” ‘Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months)–while Afghan security capacity matures–risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no […]
8/28/2009
“On August 28 [2009], the Saudi deputy minister of interior, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, survived a bombing attack launched by an al-Qaeda cell based in Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s southern neighbor. Because he leads Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda, the prince is a key target for the terrorist group. …Abdullah Hassan al-Asiri, the would-be assassin, […]
8/23/2009
” ‘…The Taliban insurgency has gotten better, more sophisticated in their tactics,’ Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced on CNN’s ‘State of the Nation’ on 23 August [2009].” – Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Page 234 […]
8/20/2009
In Afghanistan, “On August 20 [2009], election day, the turnout was just 38 percent–far less than what it had been in 2004. Few people in the south actually turned out to vote. Local officials and [President Hamid] Karzai tribal loyalists stuffed ballot boxes where nobody voted and even created hundreds of fake polling stations that […]
8/20/2009
In the Afghan presidential election on August 20, 2009, “The Taliban had threatened to derail the elections and in one sense they did: the terrified population did not turn out to vote. Turnout was half that of the first presidential elections in 2004, when it was 73 per cent. There were 400 Taliban attacks on […]