“Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, said ‘there isn’t any sense of timing’ about when to force the [UN weapons] inspection issue with Iraq. ‘Right now, getting Al Qaeda is more important,’ she said, referring to the campaign to destroy Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network. ‘The fact is that we have Iraq on the radar […]
11/30/2001
In Afghanistan, “By the end of November [2001], twenty-seven out of thirty provinces were no longer under Taliban control. Most of the Taliban had fled to Pakistan and much of al-Qaida had been demolished.” [The 30th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – Karl Rove, Courage and Consequence, Page 286 […]
11/30/2001
“A top State Department official said today [November 30, 2001] that the United States was on ‘a roll’ in its campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan and that President Bush intended to use the momentum to force Iraq to open its borders to United Nations inspectors looking for weapons of mass destruction.” – Patrick E. […]
11/30/2001
“In what was described as its greatest military error in its war against Al-Qaeda, the United States failed to commit American ground troops immediately in the battle of Tora Bora [Afghanistan, which began on November 30, 2001], Osama’s mountain retreat close to the Pakistani border, which he had used since the anti-Soviet jihad. …Why the […]
11/29/2001
In a speech to the U.S. Attorneys Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 29, 2001, President Bush said: ” ‘It is the calling of our time, to rid the world of terror.’ ” – Jeffrey Record, Wanting War, Page 140 […]
11/29/2001
On November 29, 2001, President of the American Enterprise Institute, Christopher DeMuth assembled a 12-member conservative think tank on Iraq. According to DeMuth: ” ‘We concluded that a confrontation with Saddam was inevitable. He was a gathering threat–the most menacing, active, and unavoidable threat. We agreed that Saddam would have to leave the scene before […]
11/28/2001
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary:” “313. On 28 November 2001, the JIC [Joint Intelligence Council] assessed that: -Saddam Hussein had ‘refused to permit any Al Qaida presence in Iraq’. -Evidence of contact between Iraq and Usama Bin Laden (UBL) was ‘fragmentary and Uncorroborated’; including that Iraq had been in […]
11/27/2001
In preparation for his meeting with U.S. Central Command leader General Tommy Franks on November 27, 2001, to discuss an Iraq invasion plan, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made notes to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith: “In the larger war [on terror], Rumsfeld said, the chief strategic danger was that an extremist group […]
11/27/2001
According to interviews with Pakistani intelligence Brigadier Mohammed Yousaf and CIA Islamabad Station Chief Howard Hart, on November 12, 26, and 27, 2001: “The Afghans whom Yousaf trained uniformly denounced suicide attack proposals as against their religion. It was only the Arab volunteers–from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, and other countries, who had been raised in […]
11/27/2001
On November 27, 2001, “the Toronto Star reviewed the intricate interplay of oil politics, Saudi Arabia, and al Qaeda, and commented: ‘Earlier this month, the Guardian, a U.K. newspaper, reported that FBI agents had been told by the Bush administration to back off investigating members of the bin Laden clan living in the U.S. In […]