“Both [incumbent Afghan President Hamid] Karzai and Kofi Annan, then the head of the United Nations, wanted to post international peacekeepers around Afghanistan in early 2002. But the Bush administration blocked any non-U.S. troops from deploying outside Kabul for the first two years of the occupation. [Ambassador to Afghanistan James] Dobbins recalls a meeting in […]
2/15/2002
“Unfortunately, the reappearance of the Taliban was ignored by the Bush White House, which had already set its sights on Iraq. So beginning in February 2002, and continuing without letup through the summer of 2002, just as Taliban guerrilla attacks were on the rise inside Afghanistan, virtually all CIA and U.S. military intelligence assets (including […]
2/15/2002
“…by February 2002, the allegation [that lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta met with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Prague, Czech Republic, in April 2001] had already been discredited independently by both the CIA and the FBI. They had determined that at the time of the supposed meeting in Prague, Atta was […]
2/15/2002
“By February 2002 the hawks [in the Bush Administration] were confident enough to openly announce their intention in Iraq after invading Afghanistan.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – Deepak Tripathi, Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan, Page 13 […]
2/15/2002
According to the Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005: ” ‘Another [Iraqi informant] source…was brought to the attention of DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] by Washington-based representatives of the INC [Iraqi National Congress]. Like [informant] Curveball, his reporting was handled by Defense HUMINT [human intelligence]. He provided one report that Iraq had […]
2/15/2002
In February 2002, President Bush determined that “Afghanistan (on whose behalf the Taliban technically fought) was a party to the Geneva Convention, but that because the Taliban did not wear uniforms, carry their arms openly, or follow other traditional wartime requirements, its fighters did not qualify for POW status…” [The 15th of the month used […]
2/15/2002
The Department of Defense’s ‘Militarily Critical Technologies List,’ updated in February 2002, read: ” ‘When the Iraqis produced chemical munitions they appeared to adhere to a *make and use* regimen. They had to get the agent to the front promptly or have it degrade in the munition.’ Their conclusion was that the shelf life of […]
2/15/2002
“According to one former NSC [National Security Council] official, Undersecretary of Defense Doug Feith argued in a White House meeting in February 2002 that counter-narcotics was not part of the war on terrorism, and so Defense wanted no part of it in Afghanistan. ‘We couldn’t get Defense to do counter-narcotics in Afghanistan,’ recalled the former […]
2/15/2002
“A former acting ambassador to Iraq, Joe Wilson, was asked by the CIA [in February 2002] to travel to Niger to investigate the allegations that Saddam Hussein had been seeking yellowcake uranium. …He said that he found that there was no such effort.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – […]
2/15/2002
“In February [2002], Mohammed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a nuclear watchdog office, reported to the United Nations, ‘We have found to date no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco, Page […]